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Zhou Enlai Perceived: An Assessment of his Diplomacy 
at the Geneva Confer^ce of 1954 (96 pp. 
Director: Philip West 
Zhou Enlai, the first Foreign Minister and the longtime premier 
of the People's Republic of China, made a considerable contribution 
to the establishment and development of a distinctive Chinese 
diplomacy, in both theory and practice. His legacy includes his 
diplomatic debut at Geneva, and his prominent role in China's 
tumultuous relations with the United States and the former Soviet 
Union. 
In 1954, Zhou made his diplomatic debut at the Geneva Conference 
on the settlement of the Indochina War. Throughout the conference, 
Zhou's approach to international issues revealed that he committed 
himself to the standard norms and tenets of diplomacy: persuasion, 
compromise, reciprocity and, if necessary, the use of force. His 
active and flexible diplomacy confirmed that he pursued China's 
security and its own legitimate interests in a manner consistent 
with the rules of the international stability. 
The author of this thesis made an effort to trace the historical 
sources in which Zhou developed his intellectual concept of world 
politics and diplomacy. The thesis revealed that Zhou and his 
generation as well prized such Western principles as national self-
determination, sovereignty, reciprocity and equality, and they 
attempted to turn Western ideologies and diplomatic norms into a 
Chinese approach to diplomacy, which would accomplish China's 
purposes. With this knowledge of diplomacy, Zhou successfully 
impressed the world-level diplomats at Geneva and played an 
important, and in some cases, even a crucial role in the final 
settlement of the Indochina conflict. 
However, at the same time, the thesis also points out that 
Zhou's diplomacy at Geneva should be assessed appropriately. 
Although he was accepted as one of the first-class diplomats of the 
20th century, Zhou's view on world politics was pointedly Marxist-
Leninist. He obtained his understanding of world politics and 
diplomacy from a historical context in which China was dominated by 
the Western powers. Therefore, Zhou was extremely sensitive to 
unequal and non-reciprocal treatment in diplomacy. Such a sense did 
not conform with Zhou's ideal of international equality in world 
politics. Zhou's role at Geneva should also be assessed properly in 
terms of China's domestic politics at that time, in which his views 
were always subordinat to those of Mao. In brief, as a 
controversial figure in China's history, Zhou and his diplomacy 
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In the annals of China's diplomacy of the twentieth-century, Zhou 
Enlai, the first Premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 
deserves particular attention. He belonged to a small group of 
statesmen who represented the establishment of the P.R.C. and who 
left a lasting imprint on the Chinese political scene. That 
political elite included Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Among them, 
however, Zhou stood out as the one who exercised a formative and 
powerful influence over China's diplomacy from the birth of the PRC 
in 1949 until his death in 1976. 
Zhou's former aides and retired Chinese diplomats have unanimou­
sly recalled that, although he ranked second only to Chairman Mao 
in the formulation of Beijing's foreign policy. Premier Zhou was 
actually the founder of China's diplomacy.^ As the first Foreign 
Minister and the longtime Premier of China, Zhou participated in 
all of the major foreign policy-making and diplomatic activities. 
His legacy is embodied in his prominent role in-China's tumultuous 
relations with the United States and the former Soviet Union. Zhou 
made his diplomatic debut at the 1954 Geneva Conference at which he 
played an important role in the settlement of the Indochina War.^ 
^ See Pei Jianzhang, ed., Yanjiu Zhou Enlai waijiao sixiang he 
shijian (Studies on Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thought & Practice), 
(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989), pp. 363; and Qian Qichen, 
ed., Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (The Winds and Clouds of New 
China's Diplomacy) 3 voles. (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 
1991), pp. 542. 
^ The Geneva Conference of 1954 was the first international 
conference at which China attended with other major powers to 
discuss a peaceful resolution in Indochina. 
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During his tenure, his statesmanship epitomized the foundation and 
development of a distinctive Chinese diplomacy, both in theory and 
practice, which continues to the present day. In the words of Qian 
Qichen, the PRC's current Foreign Minister: 
"Premier Zhou fully deserves to be honored as the founder 
and preceptor of new China's diplomacy, to which he made 
the most outstanding contribution in an all-round way 
during his 2 6-year tenure as a [foreign] policy maker, 
coinmander, and practitioner. . . . His expositions on world 
politics and diplomacy are accepted as the theoretical 
basis of Chinese foreign policy today. 
Given his influential role in Chinese foreign relations, it is 
important to understand the intellectual development of Zhou En-
lai's approach to international diplomacy. There have been numerous 
Chinese biographies and writings on Zhou and his diplomacy.'® In 
particular, recently-published memoirs by Chinese diplomats have 
confided to the public what they thought to be Zhou's diplomatic 
thought and style.^ With few exceptions, however, Chinese accounts 
have not yet moved beyond the "personality cult" treatment which 
regarded Zhou as the consummate diplomatist. For instance, Wang 
^ Qian Qichen, "Renzhen yanjiu Zhou Enlai de waijiao sixiang 
he shijian" (On how to seriously study Zhou Enlai's diplomatic 
thought and practice) in Studies on Zhou Enlai, ed., p. 4. 
* For example, Percy J. Fang & Lucy J. Fang, Zhou Enlai-A 
Profile. (Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe, 1986) ; Wang Bingnan, "Zhongmei 
huitan huigu," Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks in Retrospect), 
(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1985); and Kuokang Shao, "Zhou 
Enlai's Diplomacy and the Neutralization of Indochina, 1954-55," 
The China Quarterly, No. 107 (September 1986), pp. 483-504, etc. 
^ See Pei Jianzhang, ed.. Studies on Zhou Enlai--Diplomatic 
Thought and Practice; and Qian Qichen, ed.. The Winds and Clouds of 
New China's Diplomacy. 3 voles. These two books collected the 
papers written by 62 former diplomatic officials, Zhou's aides, and 
diplomatic scholars who involved in Zhou's diplomatic activities 
(1950-1975). 
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Bingnan, a senior aide of Zhou in 1954 and Qu Xing, a diplomat-
scholar, praised the Premier's "always correct" judgments, his 
notable wisdom and his realistic diplomatic style. But no one has 
seriously touched on Zhou's personal reflections on world politics 
and the nature of diplomacy in the conflict-ridden international 
system.® 
Western journalistic and academic writings on Zhou's diplomacy 
have abounded as well.^ As early as 1954, TIME magazine called Zhou 
"the great dissembler" and described his job as making China seem 
bigger and more formidable than it was or could be for some time to 
come.® In the 1960s, Kenneth Young, a former U.S. ambassador to 
Thailand, wrote, "Zhou is essentially the consxammate political 
man.... who has spent his entire adult life working to increase 
Chinese Communist influence in the world."® He made an effort to 
touch on a combination of communist ideology and nationalistic 
interest that determined Zhou's intellectual concept of world 
politics. Nevertheless, Young's analysis focused mainly on Zhou's 
style and his undisputed role in China's foreign policy. 
® Qu Xing, "Shilun yijiuwusinian rineiwahuiyishang de Zhou En-
lai waijiao," (On Zhou's Diplomacy at the 1954 Geneva Conference) 
in Studies on Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thought and Practice, pp. 245-
268; and Wang Bingnan, "Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks," pp. 1-89. 
^ See Dick Wilson, Zhou Enlai: A Bioaraphv (New York: Viking 
Penguin Inc. 1984); John Roots, Chou: An Informal Biography (New 
York: Doubleday and Company, 1978); Ronald Keith, The Diplomacy of 
Zhou Enlai (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1989); and Kenneth 
Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists (New York: McGraw-
Hill Press, 1968). 
® TIME, May 10, 1954, p. 32. 
® Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 408. 
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In recent years, Ronald Keith, a Canadian scholar, provided a 
historical and theoretical framework in which to understand Zhou's 
diplomacy. He argued that the influence of Chinese classical 
thought and strategy, the entwining of modern Chinese nationalism 
and communism, and the thrust of contemporary Chinese politics 
"made up the style and the substance of Zhou's diplomacy."^® But 
Keith did not analyze convincingly how Zhou acquired and developed 
his outlook on world politics from those three intellectual and 
situational dimensions. 
The biographies and the writings on Zhou's diplomacy, Chinese 
and non-Chinese, are helpful in understanding Zhou Enlai. Yet, they 
have paid scant attention to a fundamental question: why did Zhou 
try to pursue the goals of China's security and legitimacy through 
a "rational", instead of a revolutionary, diplomacy during the 
period prior to its admission to the United Nations in 1972 when 
China was an isolated, revolutionary power? In order to address 
this essential question on the attributes of Zhou's diplomacy, this 
thesis will attempt to probe his perception of world politics and 
the diplomacy he defined and tried to implement in the 1950s. 
For that purpose, the thesis will refer to Zhou's own words as 
revealed in his manuscripts as well as China's diplomatic documents 
in order to reveal how Zhou perceived world politics and how he 
defined diplomacy in the international system of the Cold War. I 
argue that Zhou's pragmatic diplomacy stemmed from his realistic 
Ronald Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 3-4. 
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perception of world politics during the Cold War.^^ Historically, 
Zhou derived his perception from two intertwined sources: modern 
China's contact with the West and the Chinese new generations' 
response to the Western impact. The influence of the West included 
liberal ideas such as national self-determination, sovereignty, and 
equality between states. Also involved were communist views on 
colonialism, imperialism, war, and diplomacy. No matter if they 
served the Chinese Communists or Nationalists, the competing ideas 
of the West exerted a deep influence on modern China and inevitably 
molded the views on world affairs of the Zhou's generation. As Teng 
Ssuyu and John K. Fairbank, two scholars of modern Chinese history, 
pointed out: 
"Modern China, including the communist rise to power 
there, can be understood only against the background of 
its contact with the West.... The origin and growth of 
these forces--nationalism, party dictatorship, the 
worship of technology, and emancipation of women--all 
these are new elements inspired mainly by Western 
contact. " 
Zhou's intellectual concept of world politics and diplomacy 
emerged and developed in the tumultuous context of China's contact 
with the West from the late nineteenth-century to the early decades 
of the twentieth-century. 
See Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, (Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), Pei Jianzhang, ed., Studies on 
Zhou Enlai-Diolomatic Thought and Practice; Qian Qichen, ed., 3 
voles. The Winds and Clouds of New China's Diplomacy; and Han 
Nianlong, ed., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, Contemporary China's 
Diplomacy (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1989). 
Teng Ssuyu & John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West-
A Documentary Survey 1839-1923 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1972) p. 2. 
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This thesis, however, does not purport to be an exhaustive and 
definitive treatment of Zhou's diplomatic thought and his entire 
career. It will limit itself to an assessment of his diplomatic 
debut at the Geneva Conference. One of the reasons for this focus 
is that the Geneva Conference of 1954 was the first international 
conference at which China attended with the other major powers -
the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union - during 
the heyday of the Cold War in 1954. The Geneva Conference was 
expected to relax tensions in Korea and Indochina. Beijing was not 
only proud of its presence at the Geneva Conference but also of its 
significant role in concluding an accord on the peaceful settlement 
of the Indochina war. As Robert Randle, a scholar of foreign 
affairs, put it, the Geneva Conference offered China the means for 
playing the role of a great power and... it was determined enough 
to demand a major role in world affairs. 
During the 1954 Geneva Conference, Zhou also sought to improve 
the Chinese security and to establish its legitimacy by diplomacy. 
His active and flexible approach to the Indochina issue revealed 
that he committed himself to the standard norms and principles of 
diplomacy: persuasion, compromise, reciprocity and, if necessary, 
the use of force. As Kenneth Young later wrote, "Zhou maneuvered 
imaginatively. Always striving to enhance the status and power of 
the Chinese People's Republic, he used flexible tactics and various 
gambits to try to manipulate various agreements out of the Western 
" R. Randle, Geneva 1954: the Settlement of the Indochinese 
War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 551. 
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powers [including the United States]."^^ 
Finally, in his conduct of diplomacy at the Geneva Conference, 
Zhou pursued China's national interest in a manner not inconsistent 
with the rules of international stability.In 1954, he stated the 
"two camps" doctrine was not conducive to relaxing international 
tensions. Thus, he began to reiterate five principles of peaceful 
co-existence as a basis of conducting relations among states with 
different social systems in the bipolar Cold War,^® As Qu Xing, a 
diplomat-scholar concluded, Zhou's conduct of diplomacy and his 
proposals in the mid-1950s represented "the essential traits of his 
diplomacy and his real thinking on the nature of world politics and 
the function of diplomacy."^'' 
Before turning the spotlight on Zhou's diplomacy at the Geneva 
Conference of 1954, it is appropriate to build a historical frame­
work in which his intellectual growth and diplomatic career can be 
understood. 
Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 17. 
Fairbank observed, "At the Geneva Conference of 1954, Zhou 
Enlai joined' the foreign ministers of the other powers in an effort 
to create stability in Indochina as- France withdrew." in The United 
States and China. 4th ed., (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1983) p. 406. 
The five principles are: mutual respect for each other's 
territorial integrity and sovereignty; Nonaggression; Noninter­
ference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful 
co-existence, see "Heping gongchu wuxiangyuanze, " in Selected Works 
of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 63. 
Qu Xing, "On Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 268. 
7 
Chapter I. 
The Sources of Zhou's Perception of World Politics 
Zhou Enlai developed his intellectual concept of world politics and 
diplomacy in the historical context of modern China's contact with 
the West and, in turn, of the Chinese response toward the Western 
impact. When Zhou was born in 1898, China under the Qing government 
had been overrun by the Western powers and, by then, Japan as well. 
Beginning with the Opium War (1839-42),^® China had succumbed to a 
series of foreign attacks each of which was concluded with an 
"unequal treaty" that required the Qing government to pay an 
indemnity and to concede privileges, rights, and territory to the 
victorious power.The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 once again 
revealed a China too weak to refuse anyone anything.^® Under such 
historical circumstances, Zhou and his generation were destined to" 
seek to understand the West and Japan, and to probe the ways to 
reinvigorate old China with new spirit. 
The Opium War was a notable turning point in Chinese history. 
The weakness laid bare by the British gunboats in the wake of the 
dispute over the opium trade inevitably in time forced on the Qing 
rulers a severe choice: the Qing court's extinction or the adoption 
The modern phase of China's contact with the West was 
inauspiciously opened by the Opium War (1839-42) , in which the Qing 
empire was forced to accept the treaties system dictated by the 
Western powers. 
Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution. (New Heaven, CT, Yale 
University Press), p. 4. 
This war was fought between the Qing empire and Japan 
throughout 1894-95, resulting in China's conceding Taiwan to Japan 
according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
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of the Western learning. After nearly two decades of confusion, 
debates, and domestic chaos, the leading Manchu and Chinese 
officials of the Qing court became convinced that imitating and 
adopting Western devices and institutions was a matter of survival. 
The simple line of reasoning in the scholar-officials' minds was 
that Western techniques were superior and therefore, the Chinese 
must learn and use these devices for defense. The slogan of the day 
became "Learn the science and technology of the barbarians in order 
to control them. From this emerged the Yangwu (literally. Western 
affairs) or the "Self-Strengthening Movement" as it was commonly 
known in the West. The Yangwu, which started in 1861 with the early 
promise, represented that Chinese scholar-officials clung to "the 
fallacy of halfway Westernization, in tools but not in values. 
In the following decades (from 1860 to 1895), the Qing regime 
indeed made definite progress in adopting the Western learning -
from science and technology to modern diplomatic practice. In 1861, 
the Zongli Yamen (the Foreign Office of the Qing regime), was 
created after the European model. This creation, in the words of 
Masataka Banno, a Japanese scholar, marked a turning point in 
modern China's foreign relations.^^ 
This proposal was initiated in the 1840s by Wei Yuan, a 
scholar-official, see John K. Fairbank and E.G. Reischauer, China; 
Tradition and Transformation. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1973), p. 309. 
Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 196. 
Masataka Banno, China and the West, 1858-1861; the Origins 
of Zongli Yamen (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964), 
p. 2. 
9 
First, it was the end of traditional world order defined by 
China and of its old perception of world affairs. According to the 
traditional, self-central Chinese world order, the relations of 
China with non-Chinese were hierarchic and nonegalitarianAfter 
the Opium War, however, the Qing court of China began to adjust 
itself to a new international order dominated by the West. Since 
1861, the Chinese government learned to handle the diplomatic 
disputes with foreign powers according to European legal norms, 
such as sovereignty, juridical equality, and mutual respect for 
territory. In 1864, for the first time, the diplomatic officials of 
the Zongli Yamen acquired their successful experience in the appli­
cation of Western international law. Despite their early rudiments, 
the diplomats of the Qing court conducted negotiations with the 
Prussian Minister, von Rehfues, and obtained his concessions on a 
maritime issue. 
Also in 1864, Henry Wheaton's Elements of International Law was 
translated into Chinese by an American missionary, W.A.P. Martin. 
Prince Gong, the de facto head of the Zongli Yamen, gave an order 
to deliver three hundred copies to local officials for reference. 
By the late nineteenth century, the phrases, such as international 
law, diplomatic equality, mutual respect for sovereignty - ideas 
John K. Fairbank, ed.. The Chinese World Order, (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 2. But, Professor Yang 
Liansheng argued, "Politically and militarily, in several periods, 
China recognized neighboring peoples as equal adversaries." ibid., 
p. 20. 
Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, China's Entrance into the Family of 
Nations. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 123. 
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learned from the West to use in argument with the West - began to 
appear here and there in state papers.^® However, primarily, the 
Yangwu facilitated the regular diplomatic contact between China and 
the West and involved China in an international system dominated by 
the Western powers. 
In spite of this progress in the application of international 
law, European diplomatic norms, and modern manufacturing, up to the 
1890s, Western cultural impact remained singularly marginal on the 
Chinese scholarly world. Chinese education remained oriented to the 
Chinese classical doctrines. Little had been done in the past three 
decades of Sino-Western contact to facilitate the intellectual 
communication between the Chinese literati and their counterparts 
of the West. Although the Tongwen Guan (literally, interpreters' 
school) had been set up in Beijing in 1862, its task was to train 
diplomatic officials and interpreters with subjects focusing on 
European diplomatic norms, law, and foreign languages. As Fairbank 
wrote, with an American missionary as head and a couple of foreign 
teachers and with the prompting and support of Sir Robert Hart, a 
British official, this new college soon had over one hundred Manchu 
and Chinese students of foreign languages and international law. 
Yet this innovation had to be defended vigorously against the 
attack of anti-foreign literati who objected to the teaching of 
Western subjects.^' 
As late as 1894, in Chinese-sponsored schools, there was almost 
Wright, ed., China in Revolution, p. 4. 
Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 199. 
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no place for so-called "Western learning", such as the Western 
history, geography, and other social sciences. This amounted to an 
intellectual insulation of the Chinese literati. Thus, the majority 
of Chinese gentry-literati still lived in the mental universe of 
their own tradition.^® They became aware of their intellectual 
obscuration only when national crisis was imminent. 
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 completely crushed the pride 
and complacency of the Chinese scholar-officials. This event was 
historically significant in two aspects. First of all, it proved 
that thirty years' efforts by the Qing government in the Yangwu 
were incomplete and therefore resulted in a tragic end. Second, it 
surprised Chinese scholar-officials that China could be defeated by 
Japan, formerly a cultural borrower from China but now Westernized. 
National crisis was accompanied by a sense of cultural crisis. The 
dual crises inevitably led the Chinese to question not only the 
institutional legitimacy of the entire traditional political order 
but also the tradition per se. Chinese culture was subject to 
reinterpretation and even renunciation. As a Chinese scholar Jerome 
Chen said, "Confucian confidence had gone and China was open to the 
penetration of foreign ideologies."^® 
The first wave of the Western ideologies penetrating into China 
in the wake of national crises were various political and social 
doctrines including early Marxism, anarchism, liberalism and modern 
Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System 1918-1920. 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 24. 
Cf. ibid., p. 25. 
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nationalism.Among them, the most appealing was nationalism and 
sovereignty. Since 1900, national self-determination and sovereign 
rights seemed to appear on nearly every page one read and aroused 
the Chinese as a nationalistic consciousness. 
Since the Yangwu era dated from the 1860s, China exposed itself 
to the influence of the Western values and norms. But most of them 
were specific, legal codes and diplomatic norms, rather than 
intellectual theories. These Western ideas were used conveniently 
in the negotiations with foreign powers when diplomatic issues 
arose. Only in the 1900s, did the Western ideas along with dynamic 
nationalism spread rapidly throughout the entire China. Western 
culture, including both natural science and social science, was 
introduced and pursued in all new schools. These new schools were 
either funded by the Western missionaries or were co-founded in 
accordance with the Western models. Nankai Middle School where Zhou 
Enlai pursued his education during 1913-17 was established along 
the lines of the Philips Academy model. 
In these Western-model schools, the Chinese students were eager 
to be exposed to and then accepted a faith in Western values. They 
were determined to organize a modern, centralized nation-state, 
capable of restoring China's sovereignty and reinvigorating China 
with new political, social, economic, and cultural aspirations.^^ 
Michael Gasster's "The Triumph of Anarchism over Marxism--
1906-1907," in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution, pp. 67-97. 
Chae-jin Lee, Zhou Enlai-The Early Years, (Stanford Univer­
sity Press, 1994), p. 50. 
Wright, ed., China in Revolution, p. 4. 
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This new, educated elite was in many ways the most important group 
to gain prominence in the future politics of China. Up to the end 
of 1910s, Chinese students, and youth generally, were excited over 
the prospect of China's continued reform along Western values and 
norms, arguing that China would in time be accepted by the Western 
powers as an equal member in the international system. However, the 
faith of China's youth in the Western liberalism was shattered to 
dust by 1919. 
The year of 1919 was a watershed in the Chinese history. At that 
time, internally, Chinese parliamentary institutions based on the 
Western models were manipulated by corrupt officials and greedy 
warlords. The young Republic, which replaced the Qing regime in 
1912, lacked the necessary authority and efficiency in nation-
building. This result greatly discredited Western political values. 
Externally, the European powers did not fully recognize China's 
status, even though it abided by international law and obligations. 
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the great powers once again 
ignored China's appeal for its territorial integrity. The Chinese 
were shocked by the news that the Western powers had denied China's 
appeals. Reflecting their resentment, the patriotic youth of China 
initiated nationwide demonstrations, strikes, and press campaigns 
on May 4th 1919. The "May Fourth Movement", as it was later called, 
represented the massive" Chinese nationalism primarily concerned 
with the survival of China as a nation-state.^^ 
After the Opium War of the 1840s, and in particular since the 
Y.J. Zhang, China in the International System, pp. 74-76. 
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turn of the century, the Chinese intellectuals kept seeking an 
answer or a means of resistance to the expansion of the Western 
powers which by now included Japan, into China. The "May Fourth 
Movement" was a reflection of the continuing agonizing concern of 
Chinese new generation with the debilitation and dislocation of 
China in the international system even after their complete 
perceptual change of the world. However, internal chaos, external 
humiliations and intellectual frustration - all of these elements 
combined - turned many Chinese intellectuals, especially the young, 
radical ones, against their early faith in the Western liberalism 
and toward Marxism-Leninism by the end of the 1910s. 
Under such circumstances, Lenin's theory of the oppressing 
powers in the West and the oppressed nations in the East provided 
a plausible explanation for China's failure to achieve its rightful 
claims in the diplomatic arena.According to Lenin's theory of 
world politics, nation-states, the basic unit of the international 
system, were dominated by classes having political power based on 
their economic ownership. Thus, class struggle became the law of 
society. Imperialism, as a social stage, was exclusively an outcome 
of the monopoly capitalism of the West. Capitalist monopolies were 
bent on exporting surplus capital and investing it in underdevelop­
ed areas of the world for greater profits. The unceasing drive for 
colonies and markets in a world, almost partitioned by the Western 
Benjamin Schwartz, "Chinese Perception of World Order, Past 
and Present," in J.K. Fairbank, ed.. The Chinese World Order, pp. 
276-290; and Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 10-23. 
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powers, led inevitably to international imperialist wars for the 
'redistribution' of colonies as well as to intensified national 
independent struggle in colonies or semi-colonies.^^ Accordingly, 
the people and nations in colonies or semi-colonies played a 
significant role in the revolutionary struggle against capitalist 
powers. To achieve this end, according to Lenin, a disciplined 
elite and "democratic-centralist" party must assume the leadership 
of the revolution.^® 
Lenin's theory of class struggle and his analysis of Western 
imperialism, along with his renunciation of the special privileges 
extorted from China by tsarist Russia, had particular appeal among 
young, patriotic students in China. As Harold Hinton observed, "It 
was not only Chinese tradition that had become discredited; so to 
a large extent had its Western liberal alternative."^'' The impact 
of Marxism-Leninism on the Chinese intellectuals became significant 
after the "May Fourth Movement" of 1919. 
Zhou Enlai was a student during those years. Between 1913 and 
1917, he studied at Nankai Middle School and pursued education in 
western history, world geography, and political theories such as 
Rousseau's "Social Contract," Montesquieu's "Spirit of Law," and 
Huxley's "Evolution." Like other Nankai graduates, Zhou acquired a 
broad range of knowledge from Nankai's Westernized and innovative 
R.R, Palmer & J. Colton, A History of the Modern World. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1984), p. 704. 
Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, pp. 10-22. 
Ibid., p. 12. 
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academic programs. As John Roots wrote, "Zhou's whole Nankai career 
was an incredible tour de force-a clear indication of the shape of 
things to come,"^® Four decades later, Zhou as the premier the PRC 
recalled, "I still thank Nankai school for the enlightening basic 
education that enabled me to pursue knowledge further."^® 
Zhou was initially exposed to Marxism-Leninism in Japan.''® But 
he began to accept communist theory during his stay in Europe from 
1920 to 1924. At that time, Zhou, like many student nationalists of 
the 1920s, looked to the West, the home of Marxism, for an explana­
tion of China's desperate condition of internal chaos and external 
contempt. Zhou acquired his revolutionary vision in Paris, London, 
and Berlin. Although no record has been found that Zhou enrolled in 
any European school, his exposure to living in Europe broadened 
Zhou's horizons in regard to world affairs, political activities, 
and Marxist-Leninist theories. This new awareness made him well-
prepared to assume a key position of political and intellectual 
leadership in Chinese politics when he returned home in 1924. Also 
in Europe, Zhou found communism compatible with his nationalistic 
and idealistic orientations. He believed that Marxism, especially 
Lenin's theory of imperialism, was an appropriate and convenient 
means of achieving China's long-aspired national salvation. 
Roots, Zhou: An Informal Biography, p. 17. 
Wilson, Zhou Enlai; A Biography, p. 36. 
Zhou's two years in Japan were in many ways very limited 
although he early was exposed to the Russian revolution of 1917 
there. See Chae-jin Lee, Zhou Enlai, pp. 115-116. 
" Ibid., p. 175. 
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More important, Zhou observed firsthand the social and political 
crisis in Europe. He also witnessed the domestic and international 
implications of the Russian revolution led by Lenin. His writings 
at that time revealed an appreciation of Lenin's realism and 
flexibility in his overtures to Western great powers in the post­
war era. As Ronald Keith wrote that Zhou admired Lenin for signing 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Geianany and for his diplomatic 
overtures to the West. This was in fact a case of "uniting a high 
degree of flexibility with a high degree of principle" - a unity 
which was to become Zhou's own lifelong credo in foreign affairs. 
Zhou prized the principles and language of European diplomacy, 
such as sovereign rights, national self-determination and mutual 
respect for territory. He regarded diplomacy as a means to achieve 
the end of national interest. At the same time, Zhou also adopted 
Marxist-Leninist theories on world politics. According to Marxist-
Leninist doctrines, world politics was the external expression of 
internal class conflicts, accordingly, world wars were the result 
of imperialist powers seeking to avert their domestic social crises 
and competing for the overseas markets. Thus Zhou interpreted world 
politics in terms of both Western liberalism and communism - a 
powerful combination of viewpoints that exerted a great and lasting 
impact upon modern China. 
Zhou became involved in China's politics in the early 192 0s when 
he returned to China. During the decade-long civil war between the 
Chinese Communists (CCP) and the Nationalists (KMT), beginning in 
Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, pp. 18-19. 
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1927, he became one of the dominant personalities in political, 
military, and especially foreign affairs in the CCP leadership. 
From 1936 to 1946, Zhou assumed many of the burdens of the CCP's 
external affairs. In fact, during this period, it was an important 
part of Zhou's "diplomatic method" to persuade the foreigners, in 
particular the Americans, to accept the CCP's analysis of Chinese 
political, military, economic and social conditions. John Service, 
a young U.S. diplomat in China at that time, was so impressed by 
Zhou's analytical abilities that "he loosely compared Chinese 
Communist approach to the rigorous techniques of Western social 
science.Thus, persuading and winning over of "good people" 
J 
became one of the central tasks of Zhou's diplomacy. 
In addition, he was particularly attentive to personal contact. 
He had extensive contacts with foreign diplomats, journalists, and 
U.S. military personnel who visited China during the World War II. 
When George Marshall, the private representative of President 
Trxaman, made efforts to mediate the conflict between the CCP and 
the KMT in 1946, Zhou favorably impressed him. As historian George 
Patterson reported. General Marshall spoke of Zhou with "friendship 
and esteem" and thought him "a shrewd negotiator and a statesman of 
international calibre."^* 
Despite his notable activities in China's politics, Zhou never 
confided to the public his thinking on world politics until 1949, 
" Ibid. 
George Patterson, Peking Vs. Delhi (New York: Praeger Press, 
1967), p. 48. 
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when he became the head of Communist China's foreign affairs. 
During 1949-1950, Zhou presented a series of lectures on China's 
diplomacy, world politics, and Chinese diplomatic strategy in the 
bipolar worldThese presentations not only revealed his thinking 
on world politics and diplomacy, but they also set the keynote for 
Beijing's future foreign policy. His writings in 1949-1950 offered 
insight into why Zhou tried to pursue the national interest through 
diplomacy rather than a revolutionary means while China remained an 
isolated power in the 1950s. 
On September 9, 1949, before the foundation of the People's 
Republic of China, Zhou presided over the draft of "The Common 
Program."^® This program provided that, first of all, any foreign 
government which sought to establish diplomatic relations with 
Beijing must sever its formal contacts with the KMT regime in 
Taiwan. Second, the new government in Beijing would join the 
socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. Third, there would be no 
concessions to the West for the sake of quick and easy diplomatic 
recognition.'^' 
"The Common Program" then established the basis for Beijing's 
foreign policy and its diplomatic goals. It remained ambiguous. 
See "New China's Diplomacy," "The Foreign Policy of PRC," 
and "International Situation and Diplomacy." in Selected Works of 
Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, pp. 1-48. 
The full name is "The Common Program of Chinese People's 
Political Consultation." This document, adopted in 1949, defined 
the basis policies of the PRC in the political, economic, foreign 
affairs fields. Until 1954, "The Common Program" functioned as the 
provisional institution of China. 
" Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, pp. 5-6. 
20 
however, on the specific approaches to the conduct of diplomacy in 
line with accepted international law and norms. At that time, the 
Chinese leadership was divided over its foreign policy, 
particularly among the party cadres and the non-party officials who 
participated in Beijing's government headed by the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
On November 8, 1949, Zhou as the premier of the new regime came 
out to answer the questions on Beijing's foreign policy. He was 
invited to present the first, exhaustive lecture on "New China's 
Diplomacy" at the inauguration of China's Foreign Ministry. This 
speech, along with the two more essays written in 1950, constituted 
the core of Zhou's thinking on world politics and the function of 
diplomacy. 
From the beginning, Zhou interpreted international politics from 
the perspective of the Leninist theory of class struggle. He 
accepted that the world was divided into different camps because 
nation-states were governed by ruling classes which were possessed 
of political power based on their economic monopoly. Accordingly, 
there existed two pplitical-ideological alignments in post-WWII 
world politics. One was the socialist camp headed by the Soviet 
Union; the other was the capitalist camp directed by the United 
States.^® Within the Cold War environment, Zhou believed that it 
was imperative for the infant regime in Beijing to join the Soviet 
camp for the reasons of PRC's security and legitimacy. 
"Xinzhongguo waijiao," (New China's Diplomacy) in Selected 
Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, pp. 1-2. 
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In terms of the nature of diplomacy, however, Zhou argued that 
"diplomacy should not be limited to the two camps.He defined 
"diplomacy" as the conduct of official relationships between the 
governments of independent nations. He explained that politically, 
China had joined the socialist camp. But the Chinese government did 
not discriminate against any capitalist country that was willing to 
develop diplomatic relations with the PRC on terms of equality and 
mutual respect for territory sovereignty. Zhou deemed that nations 
with different systems could coexist in a bipolar world.On the 
basis of Lenin's theory of imperialism, he added that imperialism 
(here meaning the United States) would have trouble launching a new 
world war for three reasons. First, it could not mobilize 
sufficient manpower to start a new world war; next, its allies, 
such as the NATO, would not accept the U.S. adventures; and third, 
a powerful Soviet camp was an inexorable force to deter any war 
attempt by imperialists."^^ Therefore, Zhou stated that China would 
concentrate its resources on economic reconstruction and pursue its 
security and legitimacy through peaceful coexistence. "Toward this 
end," he argued, "diplomacy was the first and foremost task."" 
At the end of his lecture, Zhou expanded on diplomacy. He stated 
Ibid., pp. 2-3. For further details, see "Omen de waijiao 
fangzheng he renwu," (Our Foreign Policy and its Tasks), p. 48. 
Ibid., pp. 2-4. 
For further information, see "Zhongsu diyuhou de guojixing-
shi he waijiaorenwu," (The International Situation and Diplomatic 
Tasks after the Signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty), in Selected Works 
of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 12. 
" Ibid., see "New China's Diplomacy," p. 2. 
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that "diplomacy embraces both unity and struggle. Strategically, we 
side with the fraternal states of the socialist camp, but also 
admit to tactical differences between those states. We are opposed 
to the [Western] powers strategically, but tactical agreements with 
them are allowed, too."^^ He regarded diplomacy as the continuation 
of war by other means. In his words, "Military and foreign affairs 
are two kinds of fights: the fight of swords and the one of words." 
Zhou concluded that "diplomacy falls within the fight of words as 
opposed to the fight of swords. To be successful, it must be backed 
up by military power"^^ In addition, Zhou spoke on the importance 
of 'diplomatic dialogue', stressing that "diplomacy implies patient 
intellectual communications for mutual understanding among nations 
because they have deeply-rooted divergences considering the races, 
religions, languages, and social norms and ethics.In this 
analysis of diplomacy, Zhou sensibly prized the conventional axioms 
^ of modern diplomacy, "the means at the disposal of diplomacy are 
three: persuasion, compromise, and the use of force. 
From Zhou's perception of world politics and diplomacy, one can 
see the profound legacy of the Western impact on China. He regarded 
world politics as the extension of domestic conflicts, but he also 
accepted western international law, diplomatic norms and rules as 
" Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 7. 
Ibid., p. 6 . 
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Publisher, 1986), p. 565. 
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efficient means of resolving international crises. The salient 
point is these two different Western ideologies (the liberal values 
and Marxist views) were accepted by the Chinese as intellectual 
sources of their analysis of world politics because they found the 
western theories helpful in achieving China's own legitimate 
interests. As Teng Ssuyu and John Fairbank observed, with the help 
of the Western liberalism, the Chinese intellectuals had torn down 
the traditional Chinese system; but now, in the process of the 
nation-rebuilding, they turned to invoke the Soviet Union and its 
communist ideology.Striving for an independent and strong China 
had been a goal to which Zhou's whole generation aspired. They 
learned the Western ideologies to serve their ends. 
As the Premier of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai 
personified the attempt to turn Western ideologies and diplomatic 
norms into a Chinese approach to diplomacy which would accomplish 
China's ends. 
Teng &, Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 240. 
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Chapter II. 
The Search for Security and Legitimacy through Diplomacy 
Upon assuming power on October 1, 1949, the first diplomatic task 
of the Chinese communist regime in Beijing was "to acquire the 
recognition of foreign governments and to enter the international 
community."^® At that time, Mao and Zhou regarded diplomatic 
recognition from foreign governments as a preliminary step toward 
the establishment of diplomatic relations. In an ideologically 
divided world, recognition might lead to peaceful co-existence with 
states of different social systems. With this belief in mind, Mao 
expressed his anxiety on the eve of the founding of the PRC. Shi 
Zhe, an intimate aide of Mao, later recalled that "Chairman Mao 
implied in 1949 if no foreign government recognizes the new regime 
of China in a few days, that would matter severely."^® 
On October 1, 1949, Mao, as the first President, announced the 
birth of the PRC to the foreign governments of the world. In his 
statement, Mao appealed to the rest of the world, saying that the 
new regime in Beijing "is the sole legal government representing 
the entire [Chinese] nation. It is willing to establish diplomatic 
relations with the government of any country which is willing to 
abide by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual 
respect for territory sovereignty."®® On the same day, Zhou, in a 
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 7. 
She Zhi, "Accompanying Chairman Mao to visit to Moscow", in 
The Winds and Clouds of New China's Diplomacy, ed., vol. 2. p. 34. 
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 7. 
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letter of transmittal to foreign governments, stressed that the new 
government of the PRC needed both diplomatic ties with other states 
and admission to the United Nations. 
At that time, the responses from the foreign governments to 
Beijing's appeal varied in accordance with their alignments in the 
Cold War and their attitudes toward the former KMT regime in exile 
on Taiwan. Zhou insisted that China should be flexible in order to 
obtain the basic essentials of statehood: diplomatic recognition, 
bilateral trade, and membership in the international organization. 
Considering the new regime of the PRC within the bipolar Cold 
War, Zhou stated that the People's Republic of China aligned itself 
with the Soviet camp in order to achieve its security and economic 
needs.Hence, he accompanied Mao on a visit to Moscow in 1950 to 
persuade Stalin to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and 
Friendship.®^ The treaty was specifically directed against "the 
revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on 
the part of Japan or any other state that collaborates in any way 
with Japan in acts of aggression."®^ Regarding its power in 1950, 
Beijing's request for an alliance with Moscow revealed the concerns 
of Chinese leaders for security, their ideological affinity with 
the USSR, and. both Mao and Zhou's perception of world politics. 
With regard to the war-torn Chinese econoiiy and its uncertain 
" Ibid. 
According to Shi Zhe, Mao was accorded a grand reception in 
the Kremlin when he arrived in Moscow, see The Winds and Clouds of 
New China's Diplomacv. ed., Qian Qichen, vol. 2., pp. 1-13. 
Han Nianlong, ed., Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 25. 
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status in the world, Beijing stood to benefit considerably from its 
alliance with Moscow. As Harold Hinton wrote, "The CPR regarded the 
Sino-Soviet alliance as its main shield and potentially as its main 
sword as well, against the imperialist camp."®^ Following Moscow's 
lead, the Soviet camp from East Germany to North Korea extended 
recognition and aid to Beijing. On October 23 1951, Zhou viewed the 
friendship treaty of the Sino-Soviet as a shield behind which, as 
he admitted, "China was not isolated in the world affairs and would 
pursue its domestic reconstruction."®^ 
Gaining diplomatic recognition from the Soviet Union and its 
allies represented only one aspect of Zhou's diplomacy. He also 
informed the Beijing Foreign Service that the PRC's foreign policy 
had to follow three basic guidelines. First, China needed to join 
in solidarity with nations of the socialist camp. Second, it should 
empathize with and win over the non-aligned states of Asia and the 
Middle East. Last, but not least, it would seek an understanding 
with the people of "imperialist" countries, trying to prevent the 
outbreak of war by practicing peaceful co-existence with the people 
of the [Western] countries.®® 
On March 20 1950, when he addressed a group of high-ranking 
diplomatic officials on foreign policy, Zhou once again stated the 
significance of an active and flexible diplomacy. He reiterated 
Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p. 122. 
Han Nianlong, ed.. Contemporary China's Diplomacy, p. 27. 
66 iiipj^Q International Situation and Diplomatic Tasks after the 
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that diplomacy must not be restricted to the two camps, and that 
China should increase contacts with each foreign government by-
virtue of diplomatic recognition, economic trade and its rightful 
seat in the United Nations." He confirmed the new government in 
Beijing was willing to co-operate with all countries and welcomed 
foreign aid on the basis of diplomatic equality and economic 
reciprocity. Because of Zhou's realistic views and flexible effort. 
The PRC established normal diplomatic relationship with nearly two 
dozen states in the first year after its birth.®® 
During this period of tiomultuous change in China's politics, 
Beijing's relations with Washington were complicated. The Chinese 
Communist victory and, consequently, the establishment of the PRC 
in 1949 created such a chasm between the two powers that neither 
government was able to bridge the ideological and political gulf. 
On one hand, the CCP political elite supposed that Washington would 
initially propose a new, equal relationship with the new government 
in Beijing, since the United States had "wrongly" supported a 
"corrupted" regime during China's civil war. On the other hand, the 
majority of American politicians were not ready to acknowledge CCP 
power in Beijing. As historian W.W. Stueck observed, "the Cold War 
had so come to dominate American's mentality that common bargaining 
was unthinkable with a communist regime that repudiated widely 
accepted standards of international conduct and showed open 
" Ibid., p. 11. 
These states included India, Burma, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Holland, Norway and all members of 
the Soviet camp. 
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allegiance to Moscow."®® 
In September 1949, Washington decided to oppose seating Beijing 
in the United Nations, moved its embassy from Nanking to Taipei in 
May, and in April even rebuffed Huang Hua, an aide to Zhou, who 
sought to explore the opening of "personal" dialogues between Mao 
and Zhou and American officials in the White House.''" Accordingly, 
China came to regard the United States as an ideological adversary 
and potentially a strategic threat as well. Washington's intention 
was perceived ostensibly as blocking Beijing's efforts to achieve 
diplomatic recognition and to enter into the U.N., which were the 
primary concerns of the new leaders of the PRC. As historian Steven 
Goldstein later wrote, "[CCP] statements about the United States 
were almost uniformly hostile. The animosity they reflected was 
both strong and clear. Any suggestions of possible ties with the 
United States were vague in 1949."'^ 
From 1949 to June 1950, Beijing's open hostility toward the 
United States included the detention of its diplomats on espionage 
charges and the mistreatment of western missionaries remaining in 
China. Still, as Goldstein discussed, "Beijing's policy and its 
conduct were constrained in what it could do by the weight of past 
W.W. Stueck, Jr.. The Road to Confrontation; American Policy 
toward China and Korea. 1947-1950. {Chapel Hill, NC: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 2. 
The author of this paper interviewed Mr. Huang Hua on this 
matter in the Clarement Graduate School, California, November 1990. 
Steven M. Goldstein, "Chinese Communist Policy Toward the 
United States: Opportunities and Constraints 1944-50" in Uncertain 
Years: Chinese-American Relations. 1947-50, ed., Dorothy Borg & 
Waldo Heinrichs (New York: Coliimbia University Press, 1980), p. 8. 
29 
policies and perceptions, the pressures of domestic public opinion 
and international commitments."'^ All of these moves and counter-
moves made rapprochement between Beijing and Washington unlikely. 
Despite its militant rhetoric, however, the CCP leadership was 
ambivalent about policy toward America. According to Harry Harding, 
a political scientist, "Mao and Zhou wished to maintain relations 
with the United States and other Western countries, both to acquire 
a wider range of commercial ties and to maintain a diplomatic 
counterweight against the Soviet Union. Before the Korean War 
broke out in June 1950, Zhou proposed that Beijing and Washington 
sit down and talk with each other in order to solve outstanding 
issues between the two countries. At that time, his writings had 
reiterated the theme that the United States needed to withhold its 
recognition of the KMT regime on Taiwan and to accept admission of 
the PRC to the U.N..'* 
Ideologically, Zhou regarded U.S. power as superficial due to 
its inevitable internal economic and social crises. On the basis of 
his assumption, he did not consider the U.S. an imminent threat to 
China, though an ideological adversary. On the contrary, Zhou had 
proposed to explore a diplomatic contact between the two powers in 
Ibid., p. 23 . 
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order to "influence American people and find the common ground."'^ 
The Korean War broke out on June 26 1950 and smashed any hope 
that the passage of time would allow the two countries to find 
these common grounds. According to Harding's recent studies, the 
Korean conflict did not result from decisions made in either 
Beijing or Washington. But strategic needs and ideological empathy 
with an ally inevitably committed the two powers to intervene in 
the Korean War.''® On the second day. President Truman ordered the 
Seventh fleet to patrol the Taiwan strait, justified this 
deployment as a military necessity imposed by the Korean conflict, 
and implied no intention as to the ultimate disposition of Taiwan. 
Beijing clearly saw it as confirming a long-standing U.S. policy of 
intervening China's civil war on the side of the KMT. Consequently, 
on June 28, Zhou delivered a strongly-worded statement, condemning 
Truman's order as "an open, armed invasion of Chinese territory in 
total violation of the U.N. Charter."'" As the diplomat-historian 
George Kennan wrote in 1950, "American policy toward the rival 
Chinese regime is one sure to strengthen Beijing-Moscow solidarity 
rather than weaken it."''® 
On September 15, 1950, under the command of General MacArthur, 
U.S. amphibious landing at Inchon was surprisingly successful and 
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 14. 
Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 26. 
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thenceforth U.N. troops drove straight north. Given the rapidly 
changing situation in Korea, on Septeinber 30, Zhou publicly warned: 
that "the Chinese people... will not supinely tolerate seeing their 
neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists."''® The next 
day (October 1), the South Korean anty crossed the thirty-eighth 
parallel as General MacArthur delivered an ultimatum to Pyongyang 
"forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such 
military supervision as I may direct."®® This move alarmed Beijing's 
leaders who regarded it as unacceptable. 
On October 3, Zhou formally siammoned K.M. Panikkar, the Indian 
ambassador to Beijing, to a dramatic midnight interview. In their 
talk, Zhou drily repeated the points of his early statements that 
Beijing would never sit idly watching North Korea being crushed by 
U.N. forces which were actually commanded by U.S. generals. He 
stated that China wished to solve the Korean crisis at the United 
Nations but was ready to intervene in the Korean War.®^ During 
their talk, Zhou also hinted of a possible compromise whereby China 
would intervene only if American forces, as distinguished from 
South Korean troops, crossed the 38th parallel. 
Ambassador Pannikar immediately sent a report of his meetings 
"Zhonghuarenmingongheguo de waijiaozhengce," (The People's 
Republic of China's Foreign Policy," in Selected Works of Zhou En-
lai on Diplomacy, p. 24. 
Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu. (Stanford University 
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81 "Meijun ruyuguo sanbaxian, omen yaoguan," (If the U.S. 
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with Zhou to New Delhi, whence it was relayed to London and then on 
to Washington. Meanwhile, Zhou's warning was passed on through the 
Chinese Foreign Service to the British minister. Sir John Hutchin­
son, in Beijing.®^ 
Washington ignored Zhou's eleventh-hour diplomacy. Historian 
Richard Whelan later wrote: one official of U.S. State Department 
awakened Secretary of State Dean Acheson shortly after 5:30 a.m. on 
October 3 and gave him the message from New Delhi. But Acheson just 
dismissed the warning as "a sheer bluff".®^ At that time, Acheson 
believed that "it would be a madness for the Chinese to enter the 
Korean War when their major concerns were with Soviet domination 
along their northern borders."®^ Since the Korean War started in 
June, the U.S. image of Beijing's possible response had been based 
on the twin assumptions: the legitimate interests of Beijing's 
regime were in no way threatened by the U.S. action in Korea, and 
that the Chinese had given primacy to their domestic needs.In 
fact, it was easy for U.S. State Department to dismiss Pannikar's 
messages; he was regarded in Washington as highly sympathetic to 
the Chinese communists. At this crucial moment, historian Burton 
Kaufman has argued, the difficulties of communication on both sides 
and false calculations on the part of the White House complicated 
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the problems of information and whence resulted in a distorted and 
unrealistic image of Chinese intention towards U.S. action in 
Korea. 
But, why did Zhou not publicly issue a formal ultimatum to the 
U.N. forces in the Korea? The answer is probably that Mao and Zhou 
would have reasoned that a private warning would enable the U.S. 
forces to halt at the 38th parallel without losing face.. Given 
their military victory, "American and the U.N. forces could then 
claim that they had decided on the basis of their own sense of 
justice and superior morality that now that the original goal of 
repulsing the North Korean invasion was achieved, the killing 
should be stopped and peace restored at once."®'' If people accept 
that Zhou wrongly chose ambassador K.M. Panikkar as a messenger, it 
was because, at that time, India, both a neutral and Asian state, 
stood as a likely link between the East and West.®® In addition, 
Beijing showed goodwill toward New Delhi because India's silence in 
the wake of Chinese "invasion of Tibet" justified Beijing's action 
in that disputed area. Therefore, Zhou believed India politically 
preferable to more traditional channels such as Danish, Swedish, or 
Swiss representatives. 
In October 1950, the Chinese regular arnY engaged U.S. forces in 
Korea. On October 25, Zhou addressed the Chinese People's Political 
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University Press, 1987), p. 87. 
®' Whelan, Drawing the Line, p. 228. 
®® Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 110-111. 
34 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) saying, "China and North Korea are 
close neighbors.... If we do not resist U.S. armies in Korea, we 
might 'encourage' its further adventures. Conversely, if we hit it 
hard, U.S. troops will be bogged down in Korea."®® In later talks 
to his aides, Zhou explained the reasons for Chinese intervention 
in Korea saying, "it is necessary to patch an umbrella before it 
rains {wei yu chou mu) .As a new power so poor in comparison to 
the United States, China dared to challenge the U.S. troops in 
Korea only because, as Allen Whiting observed, China was motivated 
overwhelmingly by concern for its own security and the legitimate 
interests,®^ At the crucial moment during the Korean conflict, Zhou 
played an equally decisive role as Mao did in the policy-making. He 
assisted Mao in making the decision to send the Chinese troops to 
enter Korea and, subsequently, directed the actions and measures of 
Chinese delegation throughout the Korean truce negotiations. 
During the Korean conflict, the two sides tested each other at 
the negotiating table as well as on the battleground. By April 
1951, the military situation on the Korean peninsula stabilized 
basically along the lines that had existed before June 26 1950. On 
July 10, the two sides, while continuing their fighting in Korea, 
agreed to hold truce talks on the discussion of the following 
®® Tian Jin,and Zhu Qing, "Luetan Zhouzongli dui chaoxian ting-
zhantanpan de lingdaosixiang" (On Premier Zhou's Strategy on the 
Korean Truce Talks), in Studies on Zhou Enlai-Diplomatic Thought 
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issues: military demarcation, arrangement and supervision of the 
cease-fire, withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, and 
repatriation of POWs from the two parties. 
Both sides readily reached agreements on the first two of the 
four issues. Even the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea 
was to be discussed at a later high-level political conference 
which was assumed to be held in October 1953. However, the issue of 
the repatriation of prisoners of war delayed the process of the 
cease-fire talks for two years. China and North Korea reiterated 
that, according to article 118 of the Geneva (POW) Convention of 
1949, POWs should be "released and repatriated without delay after 
the cessation of active hostilities," and "failing such a provision 
in the armistice, each Detaining Power must establish and execute 
without delay a unilateral plan of repatriation."®^ In contrast, the 
United States and its allies insisted on the voluntary repatriation 
of POWs, with respect for the individual right of each prisoner of 
war. 
At that time, the Soviet leaders, the CCP leaders, and the North 
Korean leaders had different attitudes toward the POW issue. Joseph 
Stalin made it clear at his meeting with Zhou on August 21, 1952 
that "it is right to press the United States to change its stand... 
[because] it is illegal for the Americans to refuse to repatriate 
POWs."®^ On September 1, Stalin again pointed out that "there is no 
United Nations Treaty Series, 75:224 (1950). 
Shuguang Zhang, "In the Shadow of Mao: Zhou Enlai and New 
China's Diplomacy," in The Diplomats: 1939-1979. ed., Gordon Craig 
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need to accept the American proposal on the POW issue, because [it] 
concerns our principles. We may detain either less than or the same 
nxamber of POWs held by the enemy. 
Among the CCP leaders, the differences on the POW issue became 
increasingly obvious. On February 23, 1953, Mao addressed the CPPCC 
and referred to the Chinese POWs captured in the Korean War. Zhou 
Qingwen, one of the highest-ranking officials who later defected to 
the West in 1959, recalled that Mao declared vehemently, raising 
his right hand high in the air, "Every Chinese officers and 
soldiers captured in the Korean War must be repatriated."®^ Mao 
explained: "We will agree upon a cease-fire only when the political 
and military situations are favorable to us. To accept the enemy's 
proposal under pressure means to sign a peace treaty under coercion 
(jie chengxia zhi meng) which is detrimental to us."®® 
But Zhou thought it necessary to achieve a cease-fire in Korea 
as long as the status quo was restored and maintained. Accordingly, 
he proposed a more flexible position on the POW issue. According to 
Xia Yan, who was one of Zhou's intimate friend, Zhou told Li Kenong 
and Qiao Guanhua, two advisors to Chinese negotiators during the 
Panmunjon truce talks, that "while we honor our commitments to our 
ally, we should also know when and where to stop fighting our enemy 
1994.), pp. 337-361. 
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(shike erzhi) He added, "Resisting America and aiding [North] 
Korea is to defend Chinese security and to honor our commitments to 
our ally. However when eneity asks for peace and enters truce talks, 
we need to make the end of warfare work to our advantage."®® 
The talks on POW issue remained deadlocked until March 1953 when 
Zhou was finally able to break the log jam at Panmumjom. Stalin's 
death apparently removed a major roadblock on the POW issue and Mao 
began to turn his focus from the Korean War to the war-torn economy 
in China. After his trip to Moscow to attend Stalin's funeral, Zhou 
held out a compromise designed to renew the deadlocked armistice 
negotiations. In his statement of March 30, he proposed that "in 
accordance with each individual's will and right, the prisoners of 
war who insisted on returning to the original side must be repa­
triated immediately; and whereby the POWs who failed to declare 
themselves in favor of repatriation would be handed over to the 
supervisory commission of the neutral countries for the final 
determination of their status and definite whereabouts."®® 
In the context of the post-Stalin uncertainty in Moscow and, by 
then, Zhou's insistence on a compromising approach to the issue of 
POWs, the Korean armistice agreement was finally signed by both 
sides on July 27, 1953. Thence Zhou Enlai could shift his attention 
from the Korean War to the broader diplomatic activities. 
Reviewing their behavior in foreign affairs from 1949 to 1953, 
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the new governing elite of China pursued two goals of security and 
legitimacy through diplomacy backed by power. They perceived and 
evaluated the events - diplomatic recognition and the Korean War -
in terms of international law, actually invoked international law, 
modified the accepted interpretations, and practiced what law 
preaches.They were also well aware that "diplomacy without 
force produces a farce, while force without diplomacy can yield a 
fiasco. Without both diplomacy and power, negotiation with its 
adversaries was unlikely or impossible. Yet, the Korean truce 
agreement did not end the stalemate between China and the United 
States; on the contrary, their stalemate expanded to three fronts: 
the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan strait, and Indochina. Moreover, 
Washington hardened its efforts to block Beijing's admission to the 
U.N. . The Chinese leaders felt the huge pressure of diplomatic 
isolation and military encirclement imposed by the United States. 
Zhou believed it necessary to circumvent this U.S. containment 
policy of China. The 1954 Geneva Conference offered him such an 
opportunity. Therefore, he made his diplomatic debut on a much 
broader international platform 
Cohen, Jerome, ed., China's Practice of International Law. 
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Chapter III 
Going to Geneva 
By 1954, China had emerged as a new force to be reckoned with in 
Asia. Its young air force was equipped with the first-line MIG jets 
second to none in Asia except that of the United States,^°^ As 
Doak Barnett, a specialist on China's foreign policy has put it, 
" [China] loomed as the colossus of the East in the eyes of many 
Asians..,. Beijing's demonstrated power now convinced many Asians 
that neutralism and accommodation with Communist China were 
necessary and desirable 
In the eyes of the Americans, however, the regime in Beijing was 
not only lawless, it was also a war monster. As early as 1951, the 
United States began to design its overall strategy aimed at contain 
-ing China through deploying its forces to the Asian-Pacific areas. 
The policy-planners in Washington regarded Beijing's support for 
the Vietminh Communists, its involvement in the Korean War, and its 
ties with the communist rebels in Southeast Asia as convincing 
evidence, in the words of Harry Harding, that "Beijing's ultimate 
goal was the communist seizure of power across Asia."^°^ 
On March 24 1953, Secretary of State Dulles warned that "our 
Eastern friends, from Japan, Korea and Formosa to Indonesia and 
Malaya, faced a single hostile front - Communist China. The Korean 
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 167. 
A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia. (New York: 
Col\imbia University Press, 1960), p. 101. 
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armistice, even if it would lead to a political settlement in 
Korea, would not have ended United States concern in the Western 
Pacific area."^°^ Months later. President Eisenhower spoke to the 
Americans saying, "we won an armistice on a single battleground, 
not a peace in the world. We may not now relax our guard nor cease 
our quest. As strategic deployments continued between 1953 and 
1954, the United States succeeded in concluding a mutual defense 
treaty with Taiwan and forged military alliances with South Korea 
and Japan. The establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi­
zation (SEATO) in 1954 was ostensibly to contain PRC's influence 
and isolate Beijing in Asia. As historian John L. Gaddis stated: 
President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles emphasized the deterrent 
power of alliances. Their aspiration was to encircle China with a 
ring of states aligned with the United States either by the 
collective security treaty - SEATO or bilateral pacts with South 
Korea and Taiwan. . . [with] the hope that a U.S. security "umbrella" 
over them would discourage Chinese attacks.^" 
Under these circumstances, Beijing's strategy encompassed two 
aspects. First, China urgently needed to develop an ability to 
deter American attack or threat of attack. In an effort to achieve 
that end, Zhou tried to manipulate the Sino-Soviet alliance to the 
Melvin Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis; 1953-54 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 32. 
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Chinese advantage. From 1950 on, Mao and Zhou looked to the Soviet 
Union for more advanced weaponry, including new missiles. Moreover, 
Zhou sensibly turned to Moscow for helping create an "environment" 
where China-U.S. contact would be made possible. According to Shi 
Zhe, "Since 1953, Zhou asked Molotov to help extricate China from 
the isolation imposed upon it by the United States. Molotov in turn 
promised that the Soviet Union was willing to make every effort to 
help China return to the world theater."^®® In the 1950s, China 
needed an influential ally, like the Soviet Union, to endorse its 
claims to the legitimate interests in the world affairs. 
Secondly, Zhou adopted a conciliatory approach toward the West 
and the other Asian and Middle Eastern nations in order to expand 
diplomatic and economic ties. On June 5 1953, he asserted: "The 
major contradiction in today's world is that of peace and war. We 
advocated the resolution of all international disputes through 
peaceful negotiations. We dare to practice peaceful coexistence and 
peaceful competition with different systems in the world at large; 
it is now the focus of our foreign policy."^"® In October, Zhou 
declared that an. armistice of the Korean War type would be possible 
in Indochina. Afterward, the Chinese newspapers began to reiterate 
the theme that "there is no international dispute that can not be 
settled through peaceful talks. On December 31, Zhou referred 
Shi Zhe, "Random Recollection," p. 34. 
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to the five principles of peaceful coexistence during meetings with 
the Indian delegation. He told his guests, "So long as the five 
principles are adhered to, any outstanding issue between states can 
be discussed on the table. Obviously, since the end of the 
Korean War, Zhou was eager to show the world that the watchword of 
Beijing's diplomacy was "peaceful coexistence" as mandatory to 
achieve its goal of security and legitimacy. 
In an effort to realize Beijing's diplomatic goals, Zhou defined 
a series of specific measures after consulating with the Politburo 
of the CCP. First, he managed to maintain the status quo in Korea 
if not to solve all the outstanding issues through the political 
conference, which was scheduled to convene in October 1953. Next, 
Zhou insisted on the restoration of peace and stability in Indo­
china through diplomacy instead of war. Last, he directed the 
communist forces of China to use military pressure against the 
offshore islands held by KMT troops. In December 1953, Chinese 
communist forces twice launched military attacks on the KMT-held 
islands. Zhou's goals were obviously to disrupt the growing 
strategic links between the United States and Taiwan and to force 
diplomatic dialogue between Beijing and Washington. 
By combining power and diplomacy, Zhou's strategy eventually led 
to an expected result. In 1954, the world at large felt uneasy 
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about the confrontation between the wealthiest power in the world 
and the most populous nation on the earth. Some of the statesmen of 
the West and East proposed to convene an international conference, 
including the PRC and the USA, to solve the crises in the Far East. 
As Kenneth Young later wrote, the pressures and dangers felt all 
over the world in the mid-1950s, born of the uneasy Korean truce, 
the critical Indochina war, and the persisting clashes in the 
Taiwan area were the prime factors in bringing the Chinese and 
American to the negotiation table at Geneva."^ 
On January 25 1954, as had previously been arranged, the Foreign 
Ministers of the "Big Four" (the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Britain, and France) met in Berlin to discuss the issues of peace 
and security of the world and the German question. At that time, 
the U.S.-China stalemate in Asia and in particular the Indochina 
war became the focus of the East-West conflict. Considering these 
dangers, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, formally 
proposed to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain, 
and France that a five-power conference including the People's 
Republic of China be. held "to seek measures for reducing tension in 
international relations. 
Not surprisingly. Secretary Dulles rejected Molotov's proposal 
and insisted on the United States would not agree to discuss the 
general issue of world peace at a five-power conference with the 
Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 23. 
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presence of the Chinese communist aggressors. He lashed out at 
Beijing's foreign policy, arguing that "nothing that has happened 
up to date enables us to say that [Communist] China is willing to 
collaborate in effort to bring about a solution on an acceptable 
basis of Korean and Indochina issues. Yet, Molotov's proposal 
was accepted by the British and French Foreign Ministers, who had 
considered that "a settlement in Asia occupied a higher place in 
their [strategic] interests."^" 
At the Berlin conference of 1954, the British Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden, capitalized on Molotov's proposal as a chance to seek 
to relax the tensions in Asia, especially the increasingly critical 
and dangerous Indochina war. In a letter to Winston Churchill from 
Berlin, Eden wrote, " [Americans] are at present strongly opposed to 
the idea of a five-power conference with China, mainly because they 
are not prepared to admit the right of Communist China to be one of 
the great powers in dealing with world problems, . . . their objection 
might be less if the conference were specifically limited to the 
Far East." Eden continued, "Mr. Dulles admits that non-recognition 
is no obstacle to meeting the Chinese and, in fact, the Americans 
are meeting them in Panmunjom. Therefore, Eden urged the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet to favorably reflect upon the possibility 
of a five-power conference on the Far Eastern problems, if the 
Americans could be brought to consider it. 
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At the beginning of 1954, it was clear that French efforts to 
crush the Vietminh insurrection were destined to early failure, 
Quai d'Orsay had disclosed to the British and the U.S. embassies in 
Paris that no French government could refuse a five-power 
conference which would offer an honorable means of bringing the war 
in Indochina to an end.^" Georges Bidault, the Foreign Minister, 
though urgent for truce negotiations, was tempted by his dream of 
making China cease helping the Vietminh as the price of her own 
participation in the Geneva Conference.Then, he accepted the 
view that it would be inexpedient to resist a proposal for a five-
power conference confined to Far Eastern issues beginning with 
Korea. In view of great U.S. role in the world affairs, Bidault 
explained to Dulles with the persuasive argument: "China, as the 
real power behind the Vietminh, could no longer be ignored. 
Accordingly, Dulles conceded to Bidault the principle of adding 
Indochina on the agenda of a five-power conference at Geneva. 
Under the pressure of U.S. allies and the critical situation in 
Indochina, Dulles modified his early rejection of the proposal by 
Molotov. In a private talk with Bidault and Eden on January 26, he 
told them that while he remained firmly opposed to a five-power 
conference, including Communist China, with a worldwide agenda, he 
had no objection to discussing appropriate issues with China. 
Afterward, Dulles indicated to the press that negotiations with 
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Conununist China were unavoidable because of French insistence.As 
a response to the modified stand of Dulles, Molotov, an veteran 
Soviet diplomat, also compromised by relating the Geneva conference 
only to the issues of East Asia.^^^ 
After three weeks hard bargaining, the four Ministers came to an 
agreement first on admitting the PRC to the Geneva Conference. On 
February 18, the Berlin four-power conference issued a communique 
foormally stating "that the problems of restoring peace in Indochina 
will also be discussed at the forthcoming Geneva Conference on the 
Korean question, to which representatives of the United States, 
France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's 
Republic and other interested states will be invited. 
The Geneva Conference became a reality; it was to assemble on 
April 26. Beijing was invited to Geneva as a major power. But this 
historical event should be considered from two perspectives. First 
of all, China emerged as a new power in Asia, and had considerable 
influence in both Korea and Indochina historically and geographi­
cally. In 1954, although Dulles refused to admit the right of China 
to be one of the major powers in dealing with a worldwide agenda, 
America's allies, i.e. Britain and France, were ready to accept 
China's status in dealing with Asian questions. Thus, the British 
and the French persuaded Dulles to modify his earlier stand against 
inviting China to be invited to Geneva. Also important, perhaps 
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more important, was that from the start Beijing received Molotov's 
firm support for a five-power conference including China as a full 
member. At that time, Molotov adhered to his tactics of insisting 
on obtaining the convening power status and full parity for Beijing 
with the Big Four in the Geneva Conference of 1954, As Kenneth 
Young later put it, "Molotov had won a place for Beijing in the 
world's top councils for the first time in the short life of the 
Chinese People's Republic. 
Because the Geneva Conference was the first international 
conference at which the PRC was invited as a "Major power, " Mao and 
Zhou attached great importance to this opportunity. In March 1954, 
with Mao's approval, Zhou accepted the invitation and began to 
supervise the drafting of the key document "Our Estimation of the 
Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation." 
This draft paper specified the strategies and ends that should be 
achieved at the Geneva Conference. It pointed out that "the United 
States, France and Britain disagree with each other, especially on 
the Indochina issue, and they have great difficulty in reconciling 
their views; the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be 
further exploited to our advantage. 
Based on this line of reasoning, Zhou directed his aides that 
"our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and 
seize every chance to contact the British, the French, and the 
representatives from the neutral countries.... [so as] to achieve 
Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 26. 
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at least a tentative agreement with them. We must try not to let 
the [Geneva] conference end without any result. He also 
stressed that everyone, no matter what his position, "must be well-
informed and observe the discipline of the delegation in any 
way." 
As for the goals of the two communist powers at Geneva in 1954, 
Moscow and Beijing agreed on high-level principles, but each side 
had a different emphasis. However, their different emphases were 
not what as K.C. Chen's analysis showed in 1969. According to Chen, 
"To Moscow, China's participation in the conference was necessary 
for the settlement of international problems; whether or not China 
was a major power, was secondary. To Beijing, [it] was necessary 
because China's power deserved such participation; whether interna­
tional issues could be settled, was not primary. In fact, Chen 
misjudged both Beijing's and Moscow's chief concerns at the Geneva 
Conference. To Moscow, the need to assert the great power status of 
its Chinese ally, was then more important than its own agenda. 
To Beijing, the new governing elite felt proud to attend the Geneva 
Conference as a newly-recognized force. Yet, that was not their 
most pressing concern. As Qu Xing put it, Beijing hoped that the 
Geneva Conference would enhance the international status of the 
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PRC, but the security of China continued to be a primary focus. In 
view of U.S. policy of aiding resistance to communism in Indochina 
and building a broad collective security alliance in Southeast Asia 
since the end of the Korean War, Zhou was primarily concerned that 
foreign military bases would not be allowed in Indochina and that 
military alliances of each Indochinese state with foreign power(s) 
had to be proscribed. As he later told the Geneva Conference on May 
12, Chinese efforts were to prevent the formation of a U.S.-
dominated alliance in Indochina and also the establishment of U.S. 
bases there. 
Zhou was anxious to achieve substantive results at Geneva. In 
early April he made a special trip to Moscow to consult with the 
Soviet leaders on the upcoming conference at Geneva. According to 
Shi Zhe, an aide to Zhou, both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low 
expectations on the Geneva Conference. Zhou, however, argued 
differently, saying "That China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam can 
jointly participate in the international conference, as the Geneva 
Conference is itself an unexpected event and is one of our 
[diplomatic] victories. It will be a bigger success if we can take 
explanations on some issues so as to resolve some disputes 
Since it was the first time that Beijing had taken part in such an 
international conference, Zhou asked that "the Chinese and Soviet 
delegates must keep close contact, so as to exchange opinions and 
"Guanyu yinduzhina wenti de fayan, " (Address on Indochina 
Issue), see Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, pp. 68-71, 
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information, rectify different stands, and support each other's 
actions. The Soviet side accepted his request. As Khrushchev 
wrote in his memoir, "we all consider Zhou a bright, flexible, and 
up-to-date man, with whom we could talk sensibly. 
During his stay in Moscow, Zhou continued to confer with Molotov 
and his advisors on foreign policy in general, on American motives 
and on the position that they might adopt at the Geneva Conference. 
Still as Shi Zhe recalled, "Premier Zhou carefully listened to the 
Soviets' views because at that time they had more reliable methods 
to acquire information on US foreign policy and had more experience 
in dealing with Americans. To show his sincerity, Zhou asked 
Molotov to teach the Chinese diplomats "how to act appropriately on 
diplomatic occasions" before they went to Geneva. 
Zhou returned to Beijing on April 12 and reported to Mao on his 
conversations with the Soviet Union leaders in Moscow. With Mao's 
approval, Zhou proceeded to make final preparations including 
determining the composition and size of the Chinese delegation for 
the Geneva Conference. He also agreed to send a huge delegation to 
Geneva for the purposes of "expanding the Chinese diplomats' vision 
and increasing their experience in international struggles; and 
demonstrating New China's strength in foreign affairs. In view 
of the possible difficulties at the Geneva Conference, the Soviet 
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Union, China, and the Vietminh decided to meet in Moscow to confer 
with each other on the specific steps at the upcoming conference 
before they went to Geneva. On April 20, the Chinese delegation 
headed by Zhou left Beijing for Geneva via Moscow on a special 
plane. In Moscow, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries 
agreed to seek in every way to realize a cease-fire and define the 
partition line acceptable to the two contending sides, to take 
advantage of differences among the western powers, and to persuade 
France to accept the peace terms through diplomatic means backed up 
by military pressure. After this final pre-conference meeting, 
the Chinese delegation headed by Zhou and the Soviet delegation led 
by Molotov arrived in Geneva in succession on April 24. Since it 
was the first large delegation sent by Beijing after the new regime 
was founded, it was all the more conspicuous. Zhou Enlai, along 
with the other foreign dignifies, became the central figure in the 
reports of the Western press. 
Qu Xing, "On Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 255. 
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Chapter IV 
Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva 
Geneva is a frequent site for international conferences, and the 
conference of 1954 was benefitted by both the United Nations 
Organization and Swiss hospitality. The Geneva Conference opened on 
April 26 and was equally concerned with Korea and Indochina. 
For two centuries, Europe had been the center of world diplomacy. 
This was where the great powers conducted classical diplomacy, 
dominated Europe, and later influenced the whole world. Since 
China, an old, oriental empire, was forced to join the European 
international system in the mid-19th century, its status had been 
dictated by the European powers. At the 1919 Paris Conference in 
particular, China's fate was at the mercy of the great powers. To 
Zhou, a college student then, the most unacceptable fact was that 
China had been aligned with the Allies during the WWI, yet it was 
forced to concede territory to its wartime ally, Japan, at the end 
of the war. Zhou's lingering resentment was expressed at times 
during his talks with foreign visitors after becoming the Premier 
of the PRC.^^® What did the Geneva Conference now mean to Zhou as 
the Premier of the world's most populous nation? Did he come to 
Geneva, as Time described, "by standing before the world as the 
face and voice of a giant determined to shut the U.S. out of Asia, 
... ambitious to build itself from poverty to power, whatever the 
cost in blood or sweatThat judgment seems too extreme to be 
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Time, May 10, 1954, p. 29. 
53 
credible. Rather, Zhou came to Geneva in 1954 to declare that: 
"The international status and rights of the People's 
Republic of China have been subjected to impermissible 
discrimination. The peaceful development and security of 
China are being constantly threatened.... It is clear 
that this situation should not prevail any longer. Our 
conference should mark the beginning of the change in 
this situation.""® 
At the Geneva Conference of 1954, Zhou aimed to pursue what the 
PRC saw as its legitimate interests; in particular, its security 
and status. 
The Geneva Conference was divided into two phases. One was the 
Korean phase of the conference from April 26 to June 15; the other 
was the Indochina phase from May 8 to July 21. The Korean phase 
officially convened on April 26 and included delegations from the 
Big Four, the PRC, North and South Korea, and twelve other states 
that had fought in Korea under the aegis of the United Nations.^^^ 
By that time, the Korean issue, which had ended at Pamumjon, 
characterized the diplomacy of stalemate of the Cold War in Asia. 
According to Article IV and Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice 
Agreement of 1953, both belligerent sides agreed to hold a 
political conference on October 26 1953 to "settle through negoti­
ations the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Korea, the peaceful unification of Korea. But tensions 
permeated the negotiations at Panmunjom when the political 
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conference began. There was no exchange of greetings and amenities 
at any meeting. By December 12, nearly fifty meetings had been held 
with no agreement being reached. Since then, neither side ever 
resumed -or settled arrangements for a subsequent political 
conference on Korea. 
Moving to Geneva, the Korean issue entered an impasse soon after 
both sides began to discuss the role of the United Nations and the 
procedures in the political settlement of the conflict. The U.S. 
and the South Korean delegates, with the support of the Western 
delegates, were determined to see that the elections were observed 
and controlled by the United Nations, but the delegates from North 
Korea, backed by the Soviet Union and China, refused to accept this 
proposal. The North Korean rhetoric reflected its bitterness toward 
the U.N. which had condemned the North Korea as the aggressor in 
the Korean War. Nam II, the Foreign Minister of the North Korea, 
insisted that a national election in Korea should be conducted by 
an all-Korean electoral commission, and that this commission be 
composed of equal numbers of members from North and South Korea in 
the important task of drafting an election law and implementing 
elect ion. However, during the Korean phase of the Geneva 
Conference, various East-West proposals for a peaceful settlement 
in Korea failed to bring about the merger of the Communist and non-
communist parts of a divided Korea. 
Neither the positions of North and South Korea nor their allies' 
agendas changed appreciably throughout May. By then, Eden, Bidault, 
Randle, Geneva 1954. p. 161. 
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and Paul Spaak, Belgium's Foreign Minister, underlined the need for 
U.N. supervision of an all-Korean election, which would have to 
take into account the distribution of population in both North and 
South Korea.Zhou argued that the U.N. had deprived itself of 
the right to supervise elections by virtue of its "illegal" 
intervention in the Korean War. He insisted that the withdrawal of 
all foreign forces from Korea was the precondition for the Korean 
people freely expressing their will in elections without external 
interference. Meanwhile, Zhou added that "China would not oppose 
international supervision of all-Korean general elections, provided 
that international supervision was implemented by neutral states, 
rather than the United Nations.""® 
According to Handle, Zhou's bitterness toward the U.N. was 
caused in part by the ends to which the United Nations lent itself 
in the Korean War, and in part by Beijing's exclusion from U.N. 
membership due to the American manipulation.^^® While maintaining 
his opposition to U.N. supervision of all-Korean elections, Zhou 
nevertheless suggested on May 12 that the participants ought not 
let the conference remain at an impasse for any length of time over 
the question of the U.N. role in the settlement. He argued that the 
representatives should be aware that this conference was held for 
the purpose of finding other ways to achieve a reasonable solution 
of the Korean issue. But due to the uncompromising positions of the 
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two sides on the role of the U.N. in all-Korean elections, the 
discussion made no progress until May 14 when the formal Korean 
session was recessed. 
Plenary sessions on Korea were resTomed on May 22, and continued 
on until June 15. Yet. there was no sign of an immediate reconcila-
tion of views on either side. On June 15, the last discussion on 
the Korean issue once again revealed the impossibility of reaching 
an agreement on the authority of the U.N. and the principles of 
free elections in the whole Korea. Even when there was hardly any 
chance for an agreement on Korea, however, Zhou proposed that "the 
participants agree to continue the efforts toward achieving a 
peaceful settlement in Korea and consider resuming possible 
negotiations at appropriate time and place. But Bedell Smith, 
the U.S. chief deputy, stressed that "the Korean armistice agree­
ment (paragraph 62), which had been approved by the U.N. on August 
28, 1953 contained more formal and exact terms for the maintenance 
of peace in Korea than did anyone's proposal. In rebuttal, Zhou 
argued that only the two contending sides were bound by the truce 
agreement and that because this Conference had been convened on a 
broader basis, it must, therefore, have its own agreement. He added 
that "if this international conference failed to conclude a basic, 
peaceful accord on the basis of consultation and reconciliation, it 
would look bad in the eyes of the international community 
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sir Anthony Eden, who chaired the last session, mediated by-
suggesting that all the proposals made on that day, together with 
the interpretive and critical statements, be made a part of the 
conference record. There seemed to be no objections to his sugges­
tion, and he brought the meeting to a close. Therefore, the Korea 
phase of the Geneva conference, for all practical purposes, ended 
in failure. A witness to the events later recalled that Zhou 
revealed regret over the rejection of his proposal relating to 
future efforts by the participants of the conference toward 
unifying Korea. He complained that "there was no express provision 
that recorded the desire of the United States as a big power to 
achieve a peaceful settlement in Korea. That would have helped the 
world be aware how it [the U.S.] tries to sabotage reaching a 
peaceful resolution at the Geneva Conference. 
It is certain that Zhou was dissatisfied with the result of the 
Korean session of the Geneva Conference. In later talks with his 
intimate aides, Zhou complained that both Dulles and Molotov were 
too stubborn to make any compromise on the Korean issue.Yet 
Zhou also believed that the Korean armistice agreement, which had 
been approved by the United Nations, had international legal 
validity. In order to prevent the Geneva Conference from ending 
without any result, Zhou pressed for continued discussion. He 
stated that the PRC delegation had brought with it the spirit of 
negotiation and reconciliation to participate for the first time in 
Ibid., p. 54. 
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this international conference. To that end, Zhou proposed to the 
Conference "Taking those views that were shared in common as a 
positive basis for moving forward in the talks and, meanwhile, in 
the areas where disagreements existed, seeking a method for their 
solution. Once the stalemated Korean Conference came to an end 
on June 15, Zhou now was able to concentrate on the Indochina 
issue, which was his primary concern at Geneva. 
While the Korean sessions were bogged down in debate, Eden, the 
British Foreign Secretary and one of the co-chairmen of the 
conference, proposed to prepare for the Indochina discussions. In 
early May, Eden first persuaded Bidault to agree to start discus­
sing the Indochina issue on May 8, cleared this with Bedell Smith, 
and then obtained Molotov's concurrence. As a result, the Indochina 
session was scheduled to begin on May 8 in the Palais des Nations. 
The participants included the delegations of the five major powers. 
North and South Vietnam, and the Laotian and the Cambodian royal 
governments. 
At the time the Geneva Conference started, the fighting between 
the French and the Vietminh had been going on for almost eight 
years. By 1954, the military situation in Indochina was detrimental 
to the French and its allies. Both the French and the Vietminh, 
having different motives, agreed to stop fighting. To the French, 
it was clear that their military efforts to crush the Vietminh had 
become impossible. In addition, French public opinion pressed hard 
on the French government to withdraw from Indochina on any terms 
Zhang Shuguang, In the Shadow of Mao, p. 360. 
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that could be negotiated with the Vietminh.^^^ But the French 
government hoped to avoid entering into bilateral talks from a 
position of weakness. The Vietminh, however, had confidence in the 
strength of their hand: in the field or at the table. In 1954, 
while his guerrilla forces intensified their fighting. Ho Chi Minh 
offered through the Swedish diplomats to negotiate a truce with the 
French. 
Moving to Geneva, the nature and extent of the truce terms 
proposed by the two sides were too divergent for an immediate 
agreement to be reached. The news of the fall of Dien Bien Phu came 
to Geneva just before the Indochina conference finally started on 
May 8. No doubt this news, so shattering to the French delegation, 
greatly encouraged the Vietminh deputies. The early differences 
loomed larger than before on such issues as the cessation of 
hostilities between the French and the Vietminh, the partition line 
in Vietnam, the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia, and the member 
-ship of the international supervisory commission. During the 
conference, Pham Van Dong, the head of the Vietminh delegation, 
became more inflexible on the terms. The Indochina talks from May 
8 to June 15 moved very slowly, except that the military staffs of 
the two sides met on May 19 to discuss the evacuation of the sick 
and wounded prisoners from the fighting areas. 
When the news of the Vietminh's victory at Dien Bien Phu reached 
Geneya on May 7, Zhou was enthusiastic. He calculated that after 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954. p. 69. 
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such a defeat, the French would no longer hesitate to accept a 
solution to the Indochina problem, and that the British would 
certainly lend their support to the French. Without British and 
French cooperation, the U.S. would have to accept a peaceful 
settlement in Indochina. At the same time Zhou was also aware 
that the Vietminh had become uncompromising on the truce terms 
since the Dien Bien Phu campaign. The Vietminh were concerned with 
their growing military might and determined to drive the French out 
of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh even called on his army and people to 
fight for a "final victory" in Vietnam. 
Now that the Vietminh had changed their promise to reach a truce 
with the French as early as possible, Zhou had to deal with the 
thorny problem of how to persuade his ally to accept a resolution 
to which both sides could agree upon. Considering the possibility 
of U.S. intervention in Indochina since May, he insisted on the 
cessation of hostilities throughout Indochina and resiomption of an 
immediate negotiations between the French the Vietminh."' In an 
effort to accomplish his ends, he had to persuade the two parties, 
especially the Vietminh, to make the necessary compromises on terms 
during the Indochina session. 
According to Chinese diplomatic journals, before leaving for 
Geneva in April, Zhou agreed to help win a substantial victory on 
the Vietnamese battleground before the Geneva Conference formally 
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began. Thus, he instructed Chinese Military Advisors Group (CMAG) 
in Vietnam: "In order to achieve a victory in the diplomatic field, 
you may need to consider if you could follow our experiences on the 
eve of the Korean armistice to win several battles in Vietnam. 
In May, Chinese artillery units and military advisors became 
involved in the Dien Bien Phu campaign. At that time, Zhou had plan 
to force the French to sit down and hold the truce talks with the 
Vietminh. This way, the latter could bargain with their adversary 
from a position of strength. Contemporary United States documents 
describe the Vietminh victory as "a major political victory to 
influence public opinion in France, .... designed to afford the 
Communists a position of strength from which to negotiate at 
Geneva." 
The Dien Bien Phu campaign realized Zhou's end in terms of the 
French position. After May 8, the French became more anxious to end 
the conflict, provided the Vietminh withdrew its "invading forces" 
from Laos and Cambodia simultaneously. Thus, the French offered a 
mutually acceptable partition proposal. However, the Vietminh 
became inflexible on two questions. First, they still refused to 
admit that there were several Vietminh battalions in Laos and 
Cambodia. They also insisted on the 16th parallel as the one and 
only partition line. Under such circumstances, Zhou needed to 
persuade his ally to make concessions on the partition line and on 
Han Huizhi, ed., The Chinese Military Advisors Group in 
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the withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Laos and Cambodia. 
On May 12, the third plenary session on Indochina was held. Zhou 
told the conference that "the deputies assembled in Geneva should 
discuss the ways of ending the conflict and of restoring peace in 
Indochina as effectively as possible.""® Toward that end, he also 
proposed, "it is essential on the basis of recognizing the national 
rights of Indochina people to seek terms that will be considered 
honorable, fair, and reasonable by the various sides concerned, and 
to take effective measures so as to achieve at an early date an 
armistice in Indochina and to restore peace in that area."^®^ Zhou 
continued, "Beijing's position on the Indochina issue is that 
peoples in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have the full right to 
achieve peace, independence, unity, and democracy and to live in 
peace in their respective Fatherlands."^®^ 
Zhou's address clearly indicated to both the Vietminh and the 
French delegates that Beijing's position at Geneva were by no means 
identical with that of the Vietminh's on every issue. Although 
China gave full support to the Vietminh's anti-colonial struggle 
for independence, it did not accept their claims to Cambodia and 
Laos. If necessary, Beijing would further persuade the Vietminh to 
agree to withdraw their military personnel from the two royal 
states and to make compromises on the partition line. The Chinese 
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concern came from superior French air power in Indochina and in 
particular from a warning Dulles had issued in a speech to the 
House of Representatives on May 20. "Continued Chinese help to the 
Vietminh," Dulles said, "might call for retaliation... [and] atomic 
weapons will be used whenever it is to our military advantage.""^ 
Since May 12, however, the discussion on Indochina brought no 
progress due to the disagreement over the withdrawal of Vietminh 
soldiers from Laos and Cambodia and the drawing of the partition 
line. An equally controversial issue was how the implementation of 
the eventual agreement(s) should be supervised. According to James 
Cable, a British diplomat at Geneva, Eden agreed upon the principle 
of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indochina. He insisted, 
however, that the principle of partition should not apply to Laos 
and Cambodia from which Vietminh forces had to withdraw immediately 
and unconditionally. Eden's objective was to persuade the conferees 
that "the problem of Laos and Cambodia differed fundamentally from 
those of Vietnam and could be simply solved by the withdrawal of 
Vietminh forces and their indigenous supporters.In addition, as 
for the composition of the supervisory commission, Eden and his 
allies accepted the idea that "no Communist could ever be neutral, 
but some non-Communist could. He accordingly proposed that five 
Colombo powers - India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon - an 
uneven number of neutral and Asian states, should provide the 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, pp. 55 & 79. 
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members of the supervisory commission. 
At the sessions from May 12 to June 9, Zhou agreed to Eden's 
proposal that the independence and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia 
should be respected and guaranteed by the international community. 
But he challenged Eden's notion that a neutral state must be a non-
Communist state, and he insisted on the stipulation that the super­
visory commission should operate on the principle of unanimity.^®® 
On June 9, Zhou argued that "a neutral nation was one which had not 
taken part in the fighting and the Korean precedent offered no 
grounds for objecting to the idea that a commission composed of two 
communists and two non-communists should take only unanimous 
decisions."^" He also dismissed the proposal of U.N. supervision, 
saying that "[The] United Nations is not suitable to perform the 
function of supervising the implementation of the armistice in Indo 
-china. 
o 
Because neither side showed willingness to compromise on the he 
withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Cambodia and Laos, the question 
of troops dispositions and regroupment in Vietnam or in the three 
states, and the composition and the principles of the international 
commission for supervision and control, the repeated discussions on 
Indochina limped along for weeks until June 16. During this period, 
even private contacts offered no hope of escape from the impasse. 
By June 10, there was greater cause for concern at Geneva. Jean 
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Chauvel, a French diplomat, complained that the Vietminh military 
representatives were spinning out talks and playing for time, while 
the Chinese and Russians were now unhelpful. Facing this dilemma, 
Eden had to tell the Conference on June 10 that divergences were 
wide and deep on the two sides. "We have no choice but to resolve 
them or admit our failure."^®® 
But Zhou was determined to move toward a substantive agreement 
on the Indochina question. Considering the complex situation in 
Indochina and the staggering negotiations at Geneva, what Zhou 
needed was to devise a compromise program which no side would 
reject and which no side would be absolutely satisfied. He was well 
aware that the French and the Vietminh were the major players, but 
Laos and Cambodia were by no means impotent pawns on the chess­
board. If the Vietminh continued to refuse to withdraw their 
armed personnel from Laos and Cambodia, the latter would request a 
western power, i.e. the United States, to provide various military 
assistance for security reasons. At Geneva, the two small states 
insisted on their legal right to accept the military assistance 
from the West when they were menaced,In order to prevent this 
from happening, Zhou proposed an early start to implement a simul­
taneous cease-fire in Indochina, and he also promised Eden to 
persuade the Vietminh to withdraw their forces from Cambodia and 
Laos. Zhou's proposal aimed to expose no plausible reason for a 
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foreign power to intervene in Indochina. His promise would ease 
both Cambodian and Laotian concerns about their national security 
and sovereignty. 
On June 15, Zhou, Molotov, and Pham Van Dong met each other in 
Geneva to discuss how to make progress on the Indochina issues. At 
the meeting, Zhou stated that it was necessary for the Vietminh to 
acknowledge their military personnel in Laos and Cambodia. In order 
to make the Vietminh accept his proposal, Zhou suggested that at 
the upcoming sessions, Pham Van Dong should admit the presence of 
Vietminh soldiers in Laos and Cambodia, but also claim Vietminh 
armed personnel were "volunteers" who entered Laos and Cambodia 
during the early years of the war. The Vietminh would withdraw 
those armed personnel from the two states according to the 
principle that all foreign troops would withdraw from Laos and 
Cambodia.According to Qu Xing, Molotov on the spot endorsed this 
proposal; and Zhou, Molotov, and Pham finally agreed that Zhou 
would put forward his proposal at the session tomorrow. 
The breakthrough came the next day. In the restricted session on 
June 16 Zhou conceded that "the situation was not the same in all 
three states of Indochina [and] the question of the withdrawal of 
foreign troops was the one to be considered.He even envisaged 
the right of Laos and Cambodia to import arms, provided that 
foreign bases in the two royal states were forbidden.After some 
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polemics, Pham Van Dong acquiesced to Zhou's proposals, which were 
subsequently endorsed by Molotov and welcomed by Chauvel, a French 
diplomat; and Bedell Smith, a U.S. diplomat. 
On the same day, Zhou requested a visit with Eden to expand on 
his ideas. Both men agreed to use all available means to end the 
tragic Indochina war, so long as a simultaneous execution of cease­
fire took place and Vietminh forces withdrew out of Laos and 
Cambodia. According to Eden, Zhou went so far as to say that the 
Vietminh should respect the unity and independence of Laos and 
Cambodia. He thought he could persuade the Vietminh to withdraw 
from the two states, and that China would recognize their royal 
governments, which might be members of the French Union, provided 
that there were no American bases in the territory. Eden said 
that he welcomed Zhou's frankness and seriousness and his wish to 
convey his remarks to Bidault, to which Zhou agreed. Eden later 
wrote that "I received a strong impression that Zhou wanted a 
settlement in Indochina and I accordingly urged Georges Bidault to 
have a talk with [Zhou] and to discuss this new offer. I told 
Bidault of my conviction that there might be a chance of a settle­
ment as the outcome of this talk, and I begged him to go into it 
with the utmost seriousness and determination."^''® 
On June 17, Zhou met Bidault and they exchanged views on matters 
of general principle relating to Indochina and the foreign policy 
of their own governments. Because that was his last day as French 
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Foreign Minister, they talked only briefly. But Bidault's talks 
with Zhou convinced him that the Chinese were anxious to reach 
agreement on Indochina; and even Jean Chauvel began to work at 
drafting a proposal which would set in motion two further sets of 
military staff talks on Cambodia and Laos. If that were accepted, 
this would result in armistice talks throughout Indochina.^'''' 
During their meetings, Zhou did not make concessions to Bidault 
detrimental to the interests of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, as 
Hanoi would later complain in 1980.^'® In fact, because of the fall 
of his government on June 17, Bidault was unable to accept any 
proposal by Zhou on the key matters. 
On June 19, Eden and Zhou met once again and talked in an easy 
and relaxed fashion that was due to the trust they had in each 
other. Eden urged Zhou not to expect greater concessions from the 
new French government than they would have demanded of its prede­
cessor. He also asked Zhou to restrain the Vietminh from launching 
any military attacks in Indochina and, in particular, stressed the 
importance of separate treatment for Laos and Cambodia.^'® Zhou said 
that he agreed with Eden's view and that mutual concessions were 
necessary. According to Andrew Stark, Eden's assistant to foreign 
affairs, Eden admitted, "Zhou was a large animal. 
Since his successful interviews with Eden and Bidault, Zhou 
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pushed his personal diplomacy further by flying to Berne on June 
23, the Capital of Switzerland, to meet Pierre Mendes-France, the 
new French Premier. The meeting was arranged at the French embassy 
in Berne, and the Premiers "exchanged views covered the topics 
vital to an Indochina settlement. Because this was the first 
summit meeting between China and France since 1949, it would 
provide a new incentive for further negotiations at Geneva. As 
Cable later wrote that the conversation lasted two hours and was 
cordial, though Mendes-France admitted that Zhou was more relaxed 
than he was: [I'hoime etait impressionant] . The two leaders gained 
a better understanding of each other's foreign policy. 
During the two-hour meeting, Zhou said what was essential was an 
armistice in all three states of Indochina, followed by elections 
in Vietnam for the reunification of that country under a single 
government.Mendes-France agreed to all-Vietnamese elections, but 
he argued these could not be held immediately. He also told Zhou 
that the Vietminh were seeking a partition line unreasonably too 
far to the South. Zhou then expressed a desire to see the two 
Vietnamese delegations establish contact. Mendes-France merely 
noted that formidable political and psychological obstacles 
prevented the nationalist Vietnamese from taking such a step. On 
the matter of a settlement in Laos and Cambodia, Zhou again showed 
a willingness to have the hostilities in those two states disjoined 
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from the issues in Vietnam. He further offered to recognize the 
royal governments of Laos and Cambodia and adhered to a policy of 
nonintervention in the internal affairs of the two royal states. 
But he conditioned his demand upon a guarantee that would prevent 
other power from establishing military bases in the two states. 
Mendens-France assured Zhou that he would promote direct Franco-
Vietminh talks and that there should be no American bases in Laos 
and Cambodia.At the end of the talk, Zhou agreed, at his French 
host's request, to persuade the Vietminh to concede on the 
partition line, but he also stressed that the concession should be 
made on the term of reciprocity. 
At Geneva, Zhou's personal diplomacy was not limited to the "big 
powers" game. He also paid considerable attention to the feelings 
of the Laotians and the Cambodians. On June 20, Zhou had talks with 
Phoui Sasanikone, the head of the Laotian delegation; and Tep Phan, 
the Cambodian Foreign Secretary. The representatives of the two 
small countries expressed their demands for an end to insurgent 
activities within their territories, and also said that if Vietminh 
forces withdrew from Laos and Cambodia, they would maintain neutral 
in the Cold War. Their positions clearly conformed with one of 
Zhou's ends at Geneva: to prevent foreign power's military bases 
from the two states.^®® Zhou reiterated his pledge to Tep Phan and 
Phoui Sasanikone that after an armistice was signed, the Vietminh 
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who presently were on their territories would be withdrawn. The 
next day, Zhou put the Cambodians and Laotians in touch with the 
Vietminh delegation in his villa at. Le Grand Mont-Fleuri 
Zhou's role now appeared salient on the part of the Vietminh. 
He himself was well aware that the final effort was to persuade his 
communist ally, the Vietminh, to accept the partition line proposed 
by the French and to withdraw its military "volunteers" from Laos 
and Cambodia. In view of Pham's wavering character, Zhou decided to 
approach Ho Chi Minh, the supreme leader of the Vietminh. 
To persuade the Vietminh to make necessary concessions on truce 
terms, Zhou could play upon the influence which China had exerted 
on the Vietnamese historically, culturally, and geographically. In 
1954, however, it was by no means an easy game that anyone could 
play well. If anyone could play it, it was Zhou whom James Cable 
described as "an extremely adroit negotiator with an astonishing 
capacity for work."^®® 
Over the centuries, the Chinese had influenced the Vietnamese 
culturally; but at times, they also used force against their small 
neighbor. Sino-Vietnamese relations were characterized by a mixture 
of friendship, suspicion, and hostility. In modern times, China had 
retained much of its traditional attitude toward the Vietnamese, 
which asserted that Vietnam should follow China's lead in foreign 
affairs. At the same time, however, it had to consider Vietnamese 
nationalism. As Hinton put it, "the attitude of the Vietnamese 
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toward the Chinese was a mixture of admiration, envy, resentment, 
and fear."^®® In 1954, the interaction between China and North 
Vietnam at Geneva again reflected their traditional relations. 
On July 3-5, Zhou met Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, the 
Commander in Chief, PAVN, in a Chinese border city, Liuzhou. They 
discussed the Indochina war and its prospects. Chinese documents 
revealed that Zhou explained to both Vietminh leaders that the Viet 
-minh was now at the crossroads of either continuing to fight or 
accepting peace immediately, with an option of resuming the fight 
later."It would be wise," he stressed, "for the Vietminh to 
cease hostilities with the French and consolidate power in the 
Vietminh-controlled areas, and look for other opportunities at a 
later date."^®^ As to the French policy, Zhou said to Ho and Giap, 
"We should do our best to support the Mendes-France Government, so 
that we can prevent the war-like elements in France from sabotaging 
[it] . This would be certainly beneficial to both of us."^®^ In term 
of Laos and Cambodia, he tried to convince Ho and Giap that "only 
through peaceful means, would we win over those two small countries 
on our side; the military pressure certainly push them to look to 
the United States. If that occurred, the war would be escalated in 
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the partition line proposed by the French and to withdraw Vietminh 
troops from Laos and Cambodia. Both sides worked to conclude a 
document, called the "July 5 document", which stipulated that "the 
guidelines adopted at the Geneva Conference should be active and 
flexible; and they are (1) to continue proposing the partition line 
at the 15th parallel on the part of the Vietminh. If the French 
insisted on their claim at the 18th parallel, the Vietminh would 
consider to retreat to the 17th parallel; and (2) to accept the 
French proposal, i.e. to have the questions in Laos and Cambodia 
disjoined from the issue in Vietnam. 
During his talks with Ho and Giap, Zhou gave his'opinion, saying 
that "the victory at the Dien Bien Phu campaign did not mean a sign 
that the Vietminh could control the military situation in Vietnam. 
In fact, the French still occupied vital strategic and urban areas 
including Hanoi and Haipong.^®^ Zhou believed that the U.S. had 
been seeking any opportunity to intervene in Indochina. An unending 
war would be detrimental to the new Vietminh regime. Considering 
the complex and uncertain situation, the most favorable and 
attainable plan was to realize the cessation of hostilities on 
terms acceptable to both sides. The French forces would retreat to 
the south of the partition line, and the Vietminh would move to the 
north and consolidate its power base in the areas adjoining to 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 257. 
Ibid. 
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China's border. In Zhou's view, "when the French troops were no 
longer in Vietnam, the Vietminh would be able to unify the whole 
nation.^®® As a return to Ho's compromise, Zhou once again made the 
pledge, "China will be a reliable rear for the Vietminh in its 
future struggle for national independence and unification."^®' 
During this meeting, Zhou used persuasion and compromise with his 
Vietnamese comrades. As Harold Hinton put it, Zhou obtained Ho Chi 
Minh's agreement to go along with the general peace plan at Geneva. 
For his satisfaction, a feeling of irritation and frustration on 
the part of the Vietminh was not too high a price to pay. The 
Vietminh could be squared with economic and military 
assistance. 
On July 10, Zhou returned to Geneva via Moscow, where he had 
talks with the Soviet leaders. The latter said that Mendes-France's 
difficulties were not only with Dulles but even with the French 
integrationist, such as Robert Schuman, an influential French 
politicians, who bitterly opposed Mendes-France and his government. 
Moreover, in early July, Dulles condemned the French and British 
"for efforts to conclude peace at any price."*®® All this had put 
Mendes-France in an awkward position. The Soviet leaders clearly 
endorsed Zhou's plan to end the war in Indochina and to have the 
Vietminh concede on peace terms. 
^®® Ibid. 
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 46. 
Hinton, Communist China in World politics, p. 254. 
^®® Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954. p. 112. 
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Considering the uncertainty of the French politics, Zhou flew 
back to Geneva from Moscow, and had a long, frank, and patient talk 
with Pham Van Dong on the night of July 12. At the outset, he was 
undecided and even suspicious at Zhou's analysis and explanations. 
Zhou had to show him the "July 5 document" and, as the spokesman of 
the CPSU, CCP, and VCP, insisted that Pham follow the official line 
written in the "July 5 document". At last, Pham agreed to talk 
Mendes-France the next day and to discuss the new offer that the 
Vietminh would accept the partition line and withdraw its remaining 
"voluntary personnel" from both Cambodia and Laos."^°° Pham's final 
concession on the issues ushered in the hope that the discussion on 
Indochina would possibly reach agreement on the four fundamentally 
controversial questions. By now, all the contending sides agreed to 
cease fighting and moved to each other's regrouping areas, as the 
agreement stipulated. 
By July 18, however, the Indochina Conference had not reached a 
resolution on the composition of the international supervisory 
commission. As mentioned early, the Western powers and its allies 
insisted that a neutral nation should be a non-communist; while 
China and the Vietminh supported by the Soviet Union rejected the 
Western opinion. On the afternoon of the 18th, Zhou proposed to 
Eden that India, Canada, and Poland should provide the members of 
the supervisory commissions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This 
combination of one neutral, one western, and one communist state 
seemed as clearly responsive to each one's requirements as it was 
Qu Xing, "Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 262. 
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altogether unexpected.As Eden later wrote that, "from that 
moment, the tangled ends of the discussion [at Geneva] began to 
sort themselves out."^°^ Zhou's suggestion brought him the great 
honor and respect at Geneva so that he was considered as a man of 
considerable intelligence, imagination and initiative.^®^ 
After seven weeks of negotiations, the Indochina Conference 
finally produced the result that Zhou desired; the termination of 
the war in Indochina and the exclusion of the Americans from that 
area. In retrospect it was true that Zhou made considerable 
contributions to the settlement of the Indochina issues at the 
Geneva Conference. Among the issues discussed, i.e. the cessation 
of hostilities; the partition line in Vietnam; the neutralization 
of Laos and Cambodia; and the composition of the international 
supervisory commission, he intervened with direct efforts to solve 
all of them, i.e. to persuade Ho Chi Minh to make compromise on the 
partition line, to have the Vietminh withdraw its forces from Laos 
and Cambodia, to obtain the guarantee from Laos and Cambodia of 
their neutralization, and to settle the tangled question of the 
supervisory commission by imaginatively initiating a tripartite 
membership for international supervision and control. In making 
this proposal, Zhou acted in the spirit of compromise. That was 
obviously Zhou's approach at Geneva, which he strongly urged other 
participants to share. 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 119. 
Eden, Full Moon, p-. 159. 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 119. 
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At three o'clock that afternoon of July 21, after frantic 
activities at all levels, the Geneva Conference started its last 
plenary session. The heads of five delegations met in the meeting 
hall: Eden, Molotov, Zhou Enlai, Mendes-France, and Pham Van Dong 
(Bedell Smith and Tran Van Do, the deputy from South Vietnam were 
absent). At that moment, the Geneva Indochina Conference, after 
many compromises and complicated negotiations, finally produced the 
three agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. These three agreements and the "Final Declaration of the 
Conference" together formed the "Geneva Accords," as they were 
later called. The "Final Declaration" was signed by the most of the 
states which participated the Conference. But the United States did 
not sign on the accords. On July 23, Secretary Dulles stated that 
"the United States . . . did not become a party to the conference 
results. But in accordance with the U.N. Charter, the United States 
would not use force to overthrow the settlements."^®^ The "Final 
Declaration" committed all concerned "to respect the sovereignty, 
the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam" and "to refrain from interference in their 
internal affairs"; it outlined the basis of an eventual political 
settlement, stipulating that the people of Indochina were expected 
to hold national free elections within a specified period of time 
to achieve democracy and freedom inside each other homelands 
To the Chinese, the importance of the "Geneva Accords" lies in that 
Randle, Geneva 1954. p. 352. 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, p. 123. 
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"the three states of Indochina were prohibited from entering into 
alliances, establishing foreign military bases and building up 
unqualified military defense."^"® These documents concluded at the 
Geneva Conference seemed the only way to meet conflicting political 
requirements, to end hostilities in Indochina and to preserve the 
peace of the world by saving face.^°'' Accordingly, the first Indo­
china war, which had lasted eight years and which was the focus of 
the East-West relations in 1954, at last ended with the interna­
tional accords. 
In retrospect, the Geneva Conference and its accords as well 
scored some results, despite their weaknesses. As Lord Avon, a 
British diplomat, later wrote, "The Geneva Conference fell short 
but not by so wide a margin. As they were defined, the Geneva 
Accords actually ended hostilities, underwrote the independence and 
neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, and created a temporary political 
equilibrium in a partitioned Vietnam which facilitated the French 
withdrawal. This conclusion resulted in nearly one million refugees 
being able to return to their homeland(s). 
Faith in the applicability of the Geneva Agreements, however, 
was from the outset challenged by the attitude of the Americans. 
Then U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower referred to the Vietnamese 
cease-fire agreement as that "terrible agreement at Geneva." He 
Ibid., p. 8. 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 124. 
Kenneth Young, ed.. The 1954 Geneva Conference; Indochina 
and Korea. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 3. 
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noted the "element of tragedy in an agreement put great nxunber of 
people under Communist domination."^®® But Bedell Smith, a U.S. 
general and diplomat who attended the Geneva Conference, repeated 
an expression which Eden had used at the conclusion of the Geneva 
Conference: The cease-fire agreements were "the best we could have 
possibly obtained under the circumstances, in which the French 
wanted to pull out of Indochina at almost any price. It is well to 
remember that diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the table 
what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."^^® On July 22, 
the French National Assembly favorably voted to support Mendes-
France's policy and the settlements on Indochina by a significant 
majority: 462 votes for and 13 votes against. 
Reactions from the three Communist countries - North Vietnam, 
China and the Soviet Union - were favorable and enthusiastic. On 
July 22, Ho Chi Minh issued an appeal to his people and forces, 
emphasizing "the great diplomatic victory at Geneva. Moscow 
reiterated its peaceful intentions in foreign affairs; and Pravda's 
editorial expressed the view that "the political importance of the 
participation of the PRC in the solving of urgent international 
problems has become clear at present as never before.^^^ Beijing's 
Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday 
and Company, 1963), p. 211. 
Randle, Geneva 1954. p. 353. 
Ibid., p. 355. 
Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954. p. 324. 
Ibid., p. 325. 
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tone was laid upon the success of peaceful negotiations and the 
"major power" status of China at the Geneva Conference. 
It was understandable that Beijing was pleased with the result 
of the settlement in Indochina, because the area of Vietnam above 
the 17th parallel was now under the communist control, no foreign 
military bases would be allowed in Indochina and Laos and Cambodia 
were guaranteed their neutral status in foreign affairs by the 
Geneva accords. With the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the 
settlement of the Indochina war in 1954, China obtained a peaceful 
environment and began its large-scale domestic reconstruction. On 
the part of Beijing's diplomacy, Zhou then urged to adopt the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the foundation for China's 
foreign policy. He noted, "International disputes could be resolved 
through negotiations, provided nations at large were sincerely 
anxious for peace. 
Zhou himself was pleased with the result. He attained his basic 
objectives at the Geneva Conference: to terminate Indochina war 
near the China's border and to prevent foreign bases and forces 
from being established in Indochina. On July 22, Zhou gave a dinner 
to Pham Van Dong and the representatives of South Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos at his villa. This was one of the occasions for which food 
was flown in from China. At the dinner table, Zhou toasted to each 
delegation present. His toast unexpectedly made friends with 
Laotian, Cambodian, and even South Vietnam, but dismayed his ally. 
North Vietnam. On the way back to Beijing, his aides asked the 
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 66. 
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premier to reflect on his Geneva experience. Zhou commented as 
follows: 
(1) . The solution of all international disputes can 
always be based on negotiations. As long as both sides 
have good will and understand each other, no matter how 
complicated the issue is, there will be a path toward its 
solution. 
(2). After a formal meeting, activities including private 
contacts provide an opportunity for participants to have 
a frank exchange of views, probe into each other's inten­
tions, negotiate and reach detailed agreements. There are 
the practical and fine methods used to resolve problems. 
(3). To find effective solutions always requires mutual 
understanding, accommodating each other's needs, yielding 
to the other's reasonable demands, and showing considera­
tion for each other's interests, so as to seek a common 
ground for an agreement. If neither side can agree on 
certain issues, they ought to be shelved for the time 
being. This is what compromise is all about.... 
(4) . When we deal with small and weak nations we must pay 
special attention to their face [jnian zi] ; in other 
words, we must never hurt their national pride. As a hig 
power, we could understand this without dif ficulties 
At the 1954 Geneva Conference, his proposals and his approach to 
international issues demonstrated that Zhou pursued PRC's security 
and legitimacy through diplomacy. Even in the mid-1950s, when 
Beijing felt isolated and contained due to the United States non-
recognition policy, Zhou still insisted on achieving legitimate 
interests of China in a manner consistent with accepted standards 
of international rules and norms. In this sense, Zhou made his 
debut in international theater of diplomacy and scored a personal 
triumph by impressing most of the diplomats whom he met at Geneva. 
The Soviet leaders, including V.M. Molotov, considered Zhou a 
bright, flexible diplomat with a balanced judgment. James Cable, a 
British diplomat, later recalled that "Zhou had great charm and 
Shuguang Zhang, In the Shadow of Mao;, p. 3 61. 
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vitality and was always completely at ease." Jean Chauvel, a French 
diplomat at Geneva, commended on "Zhou's intelligence, education, 
incisiveness and good manners." Humphrey Trevelvan, the British 
Charge d' affairs in Beijing, thought that "by any standards, Zhou 
was a remarkable • man [and an] extremely adroit negotiator with 
immense energy. Anthony Eden admitted that "Zhou was poised and 
firm in negotiation and worked for the fine point. Even Dean 
Acheson was reported to speak Zhou as "the ablest diplomat in the 
world, not excepting Mr. Churchill. 
Apart from this high praise from world-level diplomats, it has 
to be admitted that Chinese official tributes to Zhou and his 
diplomacy are voluminous as well as sometimes irrelevant. Given 
these eulogistic words about Zhou Enlai, people might have to 
question what the attributes of Zhou's diplomacy remain at Geneva, 
and how we should assess his diplomacy objectively? 
These quotations were cited from The Geneva Conference of 
1954 on Indochina by James Cable, p. 86. 
Eden, Full Circle, p. 138. 
Wilson, Zhou Enlai, p. 194. 
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Chapter IV. 
An Assessment of Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy-
Based on the materials we have at present, we can assess Zhou En­
lai's diplomacy at Geneva. Yet, it is not easy to make a balanced 
assessment for several elements. Two of them, however, seem more 
obvious. First of all, it is still too early to expect a definitive 
account of Zhou's diplomacy; i.e. to assign his true significance 
to the Geneva Conference of 1954 because of the restricted access 
to the Vietnamese, Russian, and even Chinese documents. Much of the 
evidence needed is still not available. It will take a long time 
before the surviving docximents from Vietnam, the former USSR, and 
China would be available to fill the gaps in our knowledge of the 
motives and the conduct of the principal participants including 
Zhou himself. 
The second factor is related to the niimerous books, journals, 
and articles about Zhou's diplomacy. These writings have provided 
both laymen and scholars of history with useful information. On the 
one hand, there is certain amount of credibility in most of the 
writings, although they contain various controversial interpreta­
tions. But on the other hand, there are instances where an author 
misinterpreted the evidence to substantiate his subjective ideas. 
Interpretations of the available documents are always needed, yet 
the drawing of conclusions will demand particular objectivity. For 
example, since the legacies of the Cold .War waned, controversies 
have arisen from the different interpretations of the former 
allies. In the late 197 0s, Vietnamese papers, both by scholars and 
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officials, charged that Zhou betrayed the revolutionary struggle of 
the peoples of Indochina and sacrificed their legitimate interests 
when he agreed to the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia and the cease 
-fire areas in Vietnam in a "secret deal" with Bidault at the 1954 
Geneva ConferenceHistorically speaking, this is inaccurate. As 
a matter of fact, on June 17 1954, Zhou's first approach was made 
to Sir Anthony Eden, not to Georges Bidault, the Foreign Minister 
of the politically paralysed France. When he saw Bidault on that 
day, Zhou did not, as seen from Hanoi, concede a point on the 
matters discussed. At that time, Bidault would in any case have 
been personally unwilling to accept Zhou's proposal and, because of 
the fall of his government, he was unable to.^^° 
Despite these problems, there are still notable academic efforts 
made by scholars, both Chinese and non-Chinese. Based on the 
historical materials and theoretical approach(es), these scholars 
have worked on the analyses of Zhou's diplomacy from his style to 
his influence at the Geneva Conference. For example, historian 
Melvin Gurtov wrote that Zhou was good at combining the conduct of 
diplomacy with the use of force in world politics. He accepted that 
the Korean conflict was paralleled by the Panmumjom armistice, the 
Indochina war by the Geneva Accords, and the subsequent Taiwan 
Strait crisis by Sino-American talks."By making use of the 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, p. 122. 
Ibid., p. 98. 
22^ Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, p. 163. The U.S.-China 
Talks started at Geneva in 1955, moved to Warsaw in 1957, and ended 
in 1970. Ambassador Kenneth Young called it "the longest establish-
negotiation table," Gurtov argued, "as an extension of the battle 
front and of diplomacy as the handmaiden of protracted duel, Zhou 
accelerated the trend toward neutrality in Asia. His flexible 
diplomacy at Geneva echoed a general satisfaction and, to some 
extent, pro-Chinese sentiments among the Asian states 
Harold Hinton, a scholar of foreign affairs, has argued that 
whereas the settlement in Indochina was his preferred goal, Zhou 
performed very ably and effectively. But he would have made no 
measurable progress in Indochina if he had not been supported by 
the Russians.Hinton believed that "there was no assurance that 
Beijing would be invited to future conferences like the 1954 Geneva 
Conference, in spite of its insistence that it should have a say in 
the settlement of all major international issues. 
However, Robert Randle, who has written the most comprehensive 
book on the Geneva Conference, disagrees with Hinton's analysis. He 
has argued that "Premier Zhou played an important, even a crucial 
role in the negotiations at Geneva. The People's Republic of China, 
in appearance as well as in fact, was a great power and a peace­
maker in Asia."^^^ He adds that there was no evidence that Zhou 
sought to do more than very effectively demonstrate China's role as 
ed permanent floating diplomatic game in modern history." Young, 
Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, p. 3. 
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Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p. 254. 
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a great power and the need for consultations with Beijing in the 
settlement of any East Asian problems. Finally, Randle concludes 
that "Zhou and [his] delegation's participation, performance, and 
achievements constituted a gain of a very high order at the Geneva 
Conference of 1954."^^® 
K.C. Chen, a scholar on 1954 Indochina War, placed his analysis 
on the style of Zhou's diplomacy at Geneva. He argued that Zhou's 
style was not that of senseless resistance toward opponents' views. 
Even if he did not say "yes", he never ran the risk of losing any 
chance to find the common ground. In fact, Zhou expressed a strong 
sense of the need for compromise and reconciliation which he had 
urged other participants to share [at Geneva] 
Ronald Keith, a Canadian scholar of Zhou's diplomacy, wrote in 
1989 that in the Cold War context of 1954, Zhou scored notable 
points against Dulles's diplomacy at Geneva and his peaceful co­
existence offensive gained momentum after the Geneva Conference. 
But ultimately Zhou could not arrest the United States move toward 
collective defence in [Southeast] Asia.^^® 
Recently, a few Chinese scholars who completed their doctoral 
studies in the United States, have made notable contributions to 
the research on Zhou's diplomacy. For example, the scholar of 
political science Shao Guokang considered that the qualities of 
balanced, pragmatism, and skilful articulation of means and ends 
Ibid,, p. 551. 
K. C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954. p. 315. 
Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, p. 80. 
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invariably characterized Zhou's approach to international disputes. 
He argued that Zhou's sense of moderation and pragmatic attitude 
made it possible for him to work with the Geneva major powers to 
reconcile their policy differences in 1954, i.e. the application of 
the principle of peaceful settlement in Indochina was to lay a 
basis upon which a more grand structure of an "area of peace" in 
Southeast Asia would be built.Zhai Qiang, a historian, thought 
that Zhou was a shrewd practitioner of diplomacy of the possible at 
Geneva and he excelled in playing British and French realism off 
against the rigidity and inflexibility of Dulles's Cold War diplo­
macy through uniting with all possible forces to isolate China's 
most dangerous adversary. 
Even though there are various weaknesses in these scholars' 
arguments, their efforts are helpful in understanding Zhou and his 
diplomacy at Geneva. Yet, this thesis asserts that the assessment 
ought to start with an analysis of Zhou's perception and approach 
prior to and during the Geneva Conference. 
First of all, Zhou, remarking on the political and ideological 
differences between states, perceived the world as an international 
system with various possibilities and conflicts. Based on his view 
on world politics, he endorsed the idea that China should align 
with the Soviet camp within the Cold War context, because they 
shared the similar ideology and system of government. But, at the 
Shao Guokang, "Zhou's Diplomacy," p. 502, CQ., no, 107, 
(September 1986). 
Zhai Qiang, "China and the Geneva Conference," p. 122, CO., 
no. 299, (April 1992). 
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same time, he stressed that China should through diplomacy obtain 
its own security and legitimate interests according to the doctrine 
of "peaceful coexistence". Because of his faith in diplomacy, since 
1953, Zhou echoed the theme that the use of force to settle inter­
national disputes was fruitless and that the age of the settlement 
of international disputes by negotiations was definitely here to 
stay.^^^ Shortly thereafter he hardened his efforts to conclude a 
peaceful resolution on Indochina, During the Geneva Conference, he 
was realistic and flexible in approaching to the British, French, 
and Vietminh delegates. Zhou persuaded the Vietminh to accept the 
demarcation line proposed by the French, while at the same time 
trying to advising the French to make a relevant concession. As he 
said to Mendes-France: "Each side would need to step towards the 
other . , , . which is not to say that each has an equal number of 
steps to make,"^^^ This case was a fine example of reciprocity. The 
French took the advantage of saving face because the Vietminh would 
have to accept French proposal. On the part of Ho and Pham, their 
concessions allowed the Vietminh to have the French troops withdraw 
from North Vietnam, to obtain Beijing's, even Moscow's, military 
and economic assistance, and to gain a kind of legitimacy from the 
neutral states in Asia. Thus, Zhou's debut at Geneva confirmed that 
he conformed himself to the standard norms and principles of modern 
diplomacy: persuasion and reciprocity. 
Secondly, Zhou recommended a compromise approach of "seeking 
Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954. p. 324. 
Wilson, Zhou Enlai - A Biography, p. 196. 
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common ground while reserving differences" {qiutong cunyi), From 
May 14 to July 18, the discussions on the role and membership of 
the international supervisory commission remained a thorny problem. 
Molotov proposed four neutral nations as members - Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, India, and Pakistan. But the non-communist states were 
opposed to it. Eden proposed five Colombo nations, which Molotov 
rejected. South Vietnam suggested the United Nations, from which 
China was excluded at American insistence, but Zhou dismissed this 
idea. The two sides eloquently but stubbornly disagreed with each 
other and no agreement was reached until July 18. A solution seemed 
unlikely. But on that afternoon, Zhou suddenly proposed to his 
allies and opponents to find the common ground. He recommended 
India, Canada, and Poland as the members of the international 
commission for supervision. His proposal was accepted unanimously 
and he too received great credit. James Cable, a British diplomat, 
went so far to say "When Eden went bumbling on about the Colombo 
Powers, he was rescued by Zhou Enlai."^^^ Zhou's approach made it 
possible for him to work with Britain and France, which disagreed 
with the U.S. on Indochina, to reconcile their policy differences 
and to work out an mutually accepted result. In addition, during 
the Geneva Conference, Zhou's personal diplomacy covered his sixty-
two talks, in both plenary sessions and private contacts, with the 
heads of the delegations. He even made effort to approach to John 
Dulles, the head of U.S. delegation. In this sense, Zhou appeared 
a revolutionary devoted to Chinese independence and a realistic 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954, p. 133. 
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diplomat committed to international law and the standard norms of 
diplomacy. 
Thirdly, Zhou was poised and firm in dealing with the problem of 
balancing national interest and ideological affinity. In reality, 
ideology and national interests can, and do, go hand in hand and 
are generally inextricably intertwined. As Vidya Dutt, an Indian 
scholar of foreign affairs, put it, "Ideology can not function in 
a vacuum and national interests are not totally unrelated to the 
ideology one profess. Ideology by itself does not provide any cut 
and dried answer. During the mid-1950s, Zhou spent little time 
making ideological statements. He expected to create a working 
atmosphere when negotiating with the western diplomats. At that 
time, his statements always aimed at generating expectations of 
future co-operation, i.e. according to his terminology, "finding 
the common ground and reserving the differences." In pursuit of 
China's security and legitimate interests, he insisted that most 
conflicts of interest between nation-states could be settled by 
negotiations, reconciliation and peaceful solution.All of this 
revealed that Zhou sensibly had a vision to recognize the realistic 
relations between diplomacy and force, alliance and independence, 
and international legitimacy and revolution. 
At the Geneva Conference, Zhou advised the Vietminh to settle 
the conflict through negotiations with the French as well as with 
Vidya P. Dutt, China and the World - An Analysis of 
Communist China's foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 
Publisher, 1966), p. 27. 
Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, p. 68. 
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Laos and Cambodia. On June 27, Zhou asserted that "revolution can 
not be exported, and at the same time outside interference with the 
expressed will of the people should not be permitted. He added 
that people of any state had the right to select their system of 
government without interference from the outside. His statement had 
special meaning regarding Beijing's policy toward Indochina and the 
Southeast Asian states at large. Considering the three political 
forces in world politics - the Western allies, the Eastern camp, 
and the neutral, non-aligned states, Zhou urged the peaceful co­
existence as the basis of state-to-state relations. With the faith 
in "peace diplomacy, " he worked hard to persuade the Vietminh to go 
along with the general peace plan concluded at Geneva. As Wang Bing 
-nan, then a senior aide to Zhou, told the French On May 18: "We 
are not here to sustain the point of view of the Vietminh, we are 
here to exert all efforts towards the re-establishment of 
peace. 
From the analysis of Zhou's diplomatic debut at Geneva, it is 
not exaggerating to say that he was well aware of the core tenets 
of diplomacy: persuasion, compromise, reciprocity and, when 
necessary, the use of force in order to achieve diplomatic goals. 
He successfully impressed the world-level diplomats at Geneva and 
played an important, in some cases, even a crucial role in the 
final settleinent of the Indochina issue. 
Qu Xing, "Zhou Enlai' s Diplomacy at Geneva," p. 266. 
Wang Bingnan, Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks, p. 22. 
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Epilogue 
As Mao's most influential and most brilliant advisor on foreign 
affairs, Zhou retained his authority and exerted huge impact on 
Beijing's foreign relations until his death in 197 6. During his 
tenure in this capacity, which lasted for a quarter of a century, 
Zhou logged more air miles than any other single Asian diplomat, 
visiting most capitals on all continents except Latin and North 
America, spending more time in Africa than any other ranking world 
statesmen, and surviving many a diplomatic duel.^^® During his 
longtime state activities, Zhou impressed people at all levels. His 
approach to international diplomacy was diligent, subtle, flexible, 
and persuasive. However, Zhou's diplomatic debut at Geneva, for the 
reasons relating to China's strength, its domestic power structure, 
and Zhou's intellectual concept, should not be overestimated. 
First, considering China's limited power at that time, it was 
impossible for Zhou to play a dominant role during the Geneva 
Conference. Actually, both Britain and the Soviet Union, though 
pursuing different ends, played undisputed role in the convening 
the Geneva Conference of 1954 in order to relax the crises in Asia. 
Without their efforts, the Geneva Conference would never have been 
held, much less permitted to end with even the limited measure of 
agreement actually achieved. As ambassador Young later wrote that 
"the British and Soviet heads of the delegations [at Geneva] served 
as alternating co-chairmen who mediated the critical disputes to 
produce the final compromises. Without them the conference would 
Young, Negotiating with the Communist China, p. 470. 
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have collapsed. 
Second, given the power structure or power division, Zhou never 
had full freedom to assert his diplomacy. Although he was the lead­
ing spokesman of Beijing's foreign policy, Zhou needed to consult 
with his colleagues, especially Mao, on the key foreign policies. 
In 1954, Beijing's policy toward Indochina was the result of the 
collective decision of the CCP. True, Mao and Zhou were the most 
influential personalities in handling all foreign policies. But 
when the big tv.;o clashed each other on the major decisions, Zhou 
had no option but followed Mao's lead through modifying his own 
departures at his most effort. As Wang Bingnan recalled that Zhou's 
approach to the VJest and his proposal at Geneva had obtained Mao's 
full support and trust. 
Third, Zhou Enlai was an astute and well-travelled diplomat. He 
developed many qualities of his diplomacy with practice and the 
greatest part of the necessary knowledge were acquired from his 
whole career as a Chinese revolutionary striving for China's safety 
and independence. But Zhou's knowledge of world affairs and, his 
theoretical basis of diplomacy in particular should be viewed 
appropriately. He prized the principles of international relations 
- national self-determination, sovereign rights, reciprocity and 
equality among nations. As the principles of international actions, 
these ideas are the end result of the modern history of diplomacy 
Young, ed. , The 1954 Geneva Conference: Indochina and 
Korea, p. 1. 
Wang Bingnan, Nine Years of Sino-U.S. Talks, p. 10. 
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as developed in the Western world; and they are as honored in the 
West as they are by the Chinese. Clearly, these Western principles 
could serve Zhou's goal of promoting China's big power status and 
protecting its weakness at that time. But Zhou's views on world 
politics revealed that he was a pointedly Marxist-Leninist and he 
was greatly influenced by Leninist doctrine on diplomacy. He paid 
little attention to the Western liberal theories on international 
relations, such as the roles of the international organization(s), 
foreign trade, public opinion and etc. He also appeared extremely 
sensitive to unequal and nonreciprocal treatment when negotiating 
the foreign diplomats of both East and West. Such a sense had 
nothing to do v;ith peaceful coexistence which he endorsed. 
Nevertheless, it is by no means my intention to minimize Zhou's 
influential impact on China's diplomacy by exposing his weaknesses. 
We can inherit a great legacy from Zhou's diplomacy in both theory 
and practice. True, he was well aware of the classical simplicity 
of bilateral negotiations which remained the core of diplomacy and 
he keenly grasped the balance of power diplomacy when negotiating 
the foreign diplomats. But simply repeating what he said and what 
he did will be not only sluggish but also risky in our reflection 
upon our foreign policy. True, many of the weaknesses of Zhou's 
diplomacy arose from the historical context in which he developed 
his intellectual concept on world politics. Yet, these "objective 
conditions" should not prevent us from calling into question the 
wisdom of certain aspects of his diplomacy. George Kennan wrote, "A 
nation v/hich excuses its own failure by the sacred untouchableness 
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of its own habits can excuse itself into complete disaster. If 
we excuse Zhou's "class struggle" perception and his weakness of 
the theories of diplomacy, which certainly resulted from the "Cold 
War" context, for the sake of his political holiness, it supposes 
that we will excuse ourselves for not making novel, creative and 
imaginative progress in the future. China, the young Chinese in 
general, can not rest on the laurels with which he was crowned by 
the diplomatic elite of the world. In the rapidly changing world, 
communications, technology, trade, and the influence of Western 
ideas have v/elded the entire world into the proximity that would 
normally contribute to the formation of a global village. Under 
such new circumste.nces, any stagnation in thinking or action will 
inevitably result in retrogression, ignorance, and possible fiascos 
in the future. 
George Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950. (Chicago: 
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